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As increasing amounts of data accumulate on the effects of the
novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 and the risk factors that lead to
poor outcomes, it is possible to produce personalized estimates
of the risks faced by groups of people with different
characteristics. The challenge of how to communicate these
then becomes apparent. Based on empirical work (total n =
5520, UK) supported by in-person interviews with the public
and physicians, we make recommendations on the presentation
of such information. These include: using predominantly
percentages when communicating the absolute risk, but also
providing, for balance, a format which conveys a contrasting
(higher) perception of risk (expected frequency out of 10 000);
using a visual linear scale cut at an appropriate point to
illustrate the maximum risk, explained through an illustrative
‘persona’ who might face that highest level of risk; and
providing context to the absolute risk through presenting a
range of other ‘personas’ illustrating people who would face
risks of a wide range of different levels. These ‘personas’
should have their major risk factors (age, existing health
conditions) described. By contrast, giving people absolute
likelihoods of other risks they face in an attempt to add context
was considered less helpful. We note that observed effect sizes
generally were small. However, even small effects are







































When a new threat emerges, such as that presented by the SARS-CoV-2 virus, it is very difficult for individuals
to assess the risk it poses to them personally: how likely they are to be affected by it, and how severely. These
two aspects are important components of a person’s ‘risk perception’—a subjective feeling—which also
incorporates emotional components such as worry. The emotional components of risk perception are
affected by feelings of control, knowledge about the risk and other aspects, which can cumulatively make a
risk be perceived as a ‘dread risk’ [1,2]. Risk perceptions are key drivers of behaviour, which can be
protective [3–5] but high-risk perceptions can lead to worry, anxiety and behaviours whose harms may be
greater than their benefits [6–8], and low ones to inadequate protective behaviours, which has both
individual and societal consequences. Providing information which can influence people’s perception of a
risk, then, has to be done with care and be based on an understanding of what effect it is likely to have.
As countries accumulate more data on mortality and hospitalization rates from COVID-19, as well as the
proportions who suffer long-term effects, it is possible to produce increasingly personalized risk calculators
(e.g. [9]). The issue, then, is how to communicate this potentially highly emotional information, which may
challenge people’s prior perceptions about the risk, triggering identity-protective cognition (e.g. [10]), to
diverse audiences—and what effect different presentations of such a risk are likely to have.
Risks from COVID-19 fall into one of the more difficult areas to communicate: the thought of the
disease can provoke strong emotion (or ‘dread’ [1]) which is known to affect risk perceptions [11–14];
for many people, the magnitude of the risk is low (less than 0.1% chance of dying from the disease
even if you catch it) making the numbers difficult to comprehend [15–17]; but with a very wide
variation, meaning that it is difficult to represent the range of risks on a single, linear scale. It is well
known that even relatively subtle changes in methods of communication can have profound effects on
audiences’ perceptions of risks and behaviours (e.g. [18–20]) and hence careful empirical work alongside
qualitative work with the intended audience is key to designing effective communication messages.
In this set of experiments, we set out to produce empirical evidence-based guidelines to help support
the designers of personalized COVID-19 risk communications, recognizing that they may have different
aims and core audiences. Before embarking on such work, it is vital to define these aims, audiences and
medium of the communication as these determine the outcome measures and constrain the design.1.1. Aim of communication
Communication messages lie on a continuum from a purely persuasive design (e.g. many public health
messages) where the desired outcome is behavioural change; to purely informative (e.g. informed
consent processes) where the outcome of interest is objective comprehension only. Some authors have
described ‘risk communication’ as concentrating on informing and ‘crisis communication’ as
concentrating on behaviour change (e.g. [21]).
Many trying to communicate the risk from COVID-19 might be aiming for some level of behavioural
change (people adopting either more or fewer actions to mitigate the risks from the disease), which might
mean, for instance, placing an individual into a risk band (e.g. ‘high risk’) with tailored behavioural
advice. Others may be aiming to be as neutral as possible, allowing individual interpretation of the
risk, which will naturally vary between individuals.
The first approach communicates less information to the audience and requires less from them, so may be
preferred by some, while others may find its persuasive intent less trustworthy. The second approach avoids
some practical difficulties. For example, the same additional absolute risk of death would present a very
different prospect to, say, a 9-year-old and a 90-year-old because of their different background levels of risk,
making automated categorization of risks difficult. Simply presenting the absolute risks and allowing the
audience to interpret them avoids that difficulty, but makes the communication element more challenging.
We approached this study from the perspective of those wishing purely to inform their audience, to
support those trying to meet this communication challenge, but also collected data on the public’s
opinion and preferences on where they would expect individualized COVID-19 risk communication to
fall along this spectrum.1.2. Audience for communication
The main audience for our purposes was the general public. This presents the greatest communication




































contexts (e.g. use by a healthcare professional in checking a patient’s risk while making treatment
decisions, or communicating risk to an individual patient).oyalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rsos
R.Soc.1.3. Medium of communication
We designed the communications for use online, optimized for mobile phone screens and possible to
print out, but hope that our findings will be more broadly generalizable.
Our study was carried out during the COVID-19 pandemic with the aim of providing information in
real time to communicators who were producing personalized COVID-19 risk calculators, so our
methods involved some pragmatic design choices.
We ran a series of qualitative interviews, first with members of the public and then with primary care
physicians, which fed into design choices throughout the process. After the initial rounds of qualitative
interviews, we started potential designs of the communication and refined these through further
interviews and, simultaneously, through a set of quantitative experiments. Overall we focused on a
number of key research questions: Open
Sci.8:2017211.4. What are the information needs of the public?
Even taking into account the potential range of aims that different communicators might have when
approaching the communication of personalized risk from COVID-19, it is important to understand
what the public’s current state of knowledge on the subject is, and what information they particularly
want to have (or specifically not to have).
One method of approaching risk communication is the ‘mental models’ approach, whereby
researchers use both qualitative and quantitative methods to build up an understanding of the
audience’s intuitive model of causality in a situation, as well as the probabilities they ascribe to the
likelihoods of different events and the strengths of causal relationships. The idea is then to provide
the audience with information to help bring their understanding of the situation closer to the expert
understanding of it, correcting any misunderstandings or providing missing pieces of information
[22,23]. In this study, we did not set out to complete a full ‘mental models’ approach as our aim was
to communicate a specific piece of information (an individual’s risk of dying from COVID-19 should
they catch it), but we did want to capture the audience’s existing knowledge about this topic, and
their information priorities and preferences, in order to tailor communications.1.5. Which format should probabilities be presented in?
Probabilistic information can be represented numerically in different ways, and research has shown that
these different formats can affect the perception of likelihoods as well as affecting the ease with which
people can make mental comparisons and manipulations of the information [24–28]. Since in this
particular example the probabilities being represented were often very small, we wished to explore
explicitly how different possible formats affected people’s perceptions of the risks portrayed across the
range of probabilities, from 1 in 10 000 (a very low risk) to 1 in 5 (a very high risk).1.6. How should context be provided for the numbers?
Numbers on their own do not convey a perception of quantity—they need to be given context,
particularly when the numbers are small [29]. However, the choice of the context (such as
comparators for the risk) just like the choice of frame (discussed below) can clearly influence the
perception of a risk [30–33]. Choosing contextual information that is ‘informative’ without being
‘persuasive’ is hard, if not impossible. A risk is more than just a number, a likelihood, and attempting
to present risks to compare with each other which, to the audience, represent very different concepts
can be perceived as unhelpful at best—manipulative at worst [33]. There is a paucity of empirical
literature on the effects of different kinds of comparator risks on risk perception (e.g. [34]). Slovic [35]
warns that the choice needs to take into account people’s differing feelings about different risks. It is,
therefore, important to work with the intended audience to find ways to provide context to the






































1.7. Should the numbers be visualized and how?
Most people do not ‘think’ in numbers. Visually showing the comparative difference between numerical
quantities could help subjective comprehension of them. People have an innate sense of quantity, before
even being taught about number symbols, and the use of number lines and other graphics has been
proposed to help people assess and compare quantities without the need for formal symbolic number
sense [36,37]. Work into the best ways to visualize numbers for risk communication purposes is
ongoing and varies by context and with the magnitude of the numbers [19]. Small probabilities
cannot easily be visualized using icon arrays, one of the most popular methods of visualizing risk, as
the denominators need to be so large, but visual number lines, called risk ladders, can be useful—
although research on them has proved inconsistent [17].
When constructing a graphical scale such as a risk ladder, the question arises of whether to represent
the numbers on a linear or nonlinear scale. When the probabilities being portrayed are very small and/or
vary over several orders of magnitude, a logarithmic scale such as the Paling perspective scale [38]—a
chart designed to try to help put new risks into a context of everyday experiences by plotting a
number of ‘familiar’ risks on a logarithmic scale—is popular. However, it is not clear whether such
scales allow people to judge the relative sizes of risks [31,39].
1.8. Should positive or negative framing of the numbers be used?
The fact that the framing of numbers (whether they represent a positive outcome or gain versus whether
they represent a negative outcome or loss) affects the perception of risks is one of the most robust findings
in psychology and risk perception [40,41]. However, to understand the magnitude of its effect in any
given situation and with any given audience requires empirical testing.
Across all our experiments we were interested in a number of outcome measures. Because our aim
was not explicit behaviour change, we decided instead to use Weinstein and Sandman’s effective
message evaluation measures as a starting point: objective comprehension, agreement with
recommendations/advice, dose–response consistency (do people facing a higher dose of the hazard perceive
greater risk?), hazard–response consistency (do people facing a hazard that is higher in risk perceive
greater risk?), uniformity in response (do people exposed to the same level of risk tend to have similar
responses to it?), audience evaluation (subjective measures) and a regard for types of failure of the
communication and how acceptable those might be [42].
Alongside these, we were interested in how different methods of communication affected
participants’ risk perception (as measured by their assessment of the likelihood, severity and worry
about the risk), their perception of the uncertainty in the estimate, and their trust in the communication.
By addressing this series of research questions and different endpoints, we hoped to be able to
produce an evidence-based set of guidelines for practitioners attempting to communicate people’s
individual risk from COVID-19 in such a way as to suit their own aims.
This study consisted of four online large-scale quantitative surveys, supported by four rounds of
interviews with members of the public and one round of interviews with primary care physicians.
The qualitative interviews were run as an iterative process in parallel with the quantitative surveys,
each informing design of the risk communications, which were refined constantly in the light of findings.
We outline specific pre-registered analysis plans below as we set out each part of the study.2. Participants and practicalities
This study was approved by the Psychological Research Ethics Committee at the University of
Cambridge (PRE.2020.070).
Qualitative interviewswere carried out via video conferencingdue to the pandemic. Recruitment initially
used convenience and snowball sampling techniques. Participants from previous studies, and individuals
who were otherwise known to the study team were contacted. They were asked to share an invitation to
participate with family and friends. This led to a list of around 85 participants for whom we had basic
demographic data (age, ethnicity and sometimes health status). Purposive sampling from this participant
list led to interviews with a broad demographic range of individuals in each round of testing.
Prior to interviews, participants were given relevant information about the study so they could






































these were answered by the study team. Informed consent was taken at the beginning of each interview
via an online survey platform. Participants received a £10 store voucher as payment for taking part.
All quantitative experiments were carried out online, with participants recruited through the ISO-
accredited polling company Respondi. Quotas were set to ensure recruitment of UK participants
representative of the national population on age and sex. Participants were paid £2.50 and each
survey lasted 20–25 min.
Participants in the quantitative surveys were quota sampled so as to be representative of the UK
population on age and sex. In survey 1, they were also quota sampled by ethnicity to be
representative of the UK (we prioritized ethnicity representation in this survey over representation by
sex, as we believed it more important when collecting information to be representative on ethnicity in
this context, hence there was a slight difference in sex ratio in survey 1).
Participants were excluded from participating in more than one survey. In addition, demographic
information was collected: age, sex registered at birth, COVID-19 risk perception (measured by six items
from [5]), numeracy (using a sum of their score on the adaptive Berlin numeracy test [43], three items
from [44] and a single item from [45], electronic supplementary material, appendix S4), household
income, employment status, whether they had, or suspected they had, coronavirus, perceived social
status [46], health literacy (using subscale 9, ‘Understanding health information well enough to know
what to do’, of the Health Literacy Questionnaire [47], electronic supplementary material, appendix S4),
ethnicity and education level. See table 1 for a summary of participant characteristics.
All stages of the study were carried out between the 3 June 2020 and 23 July 2020.17213. Qualitative interviews and survey 1
3.1. Introduction
The first stage of a good risk communication process, as already described, is to understand the
audiences’ information needs and their existing understanding of the subject. We approached this
both through qualitative methods and a quantitative survey.
Qualitative methods, in the form of semi-structured interviews, were used as they are suited to
exploratory research, including hypothesis generation, as well as producing detailed and rich
descriptions of the phenomenon under study [48]. The flexible nature of semi-structured interviews
has many benefits, including enhancing the flow of the interview. However, this means that at times
not all participants are asked every question in the interview guide. Interviews were split into two
phases: discovery and alpha. Discovery interviews aimed to understand the user, their needs and their
expectations of a tool for communicating personalized risks from COVID-19. The iterative alpha phase
allowed design and testing of potential communications, concentrating on the aspects already
introduced: what format to present probabilities in (frequencies or percentages), how to convey a
context for the numbers presented, and—on visual representations—whether to use a linear or
logarithmic scale, and the effects of colours. As per the use of semi-structured interviews, the
interview guide was adjusted for clarity, and questions changed according to the focus of the research,
between each round. Care was also taken to allow other themes to emerge from the conversations that
would help the development of communications.
The quantitative survey was designed to capture a snapshot of the risk perception and understanding
of individuals’ personal risk, as well as information desires of the UK public. The perception of a risk and
the numerical understanding of its likelihood and severity are two very different things. Risk perception
takes into account emotional factors such as worry about the potential outcomes and therefore depends
on an individual’s circumstances (e.g. what impact ‘being too ill to work for two weeks’ will have on an
individual; what the relative increase in their risk is). Knowing the audiences’ prior perceptions of the
risk helps understand the potential impact of communicating about it. There were no planned
statistical analyses.
3.2. Methods
The discovery phase of the qualitative work consisted of one round of interviews each with the general
public (n = 6) and primary care physicians (n = 7). The alpha phase consisted of four rounds of interviews
(R1: n = 6, R2a: n = 4, R2b: n = 4, R3: n = 8) with the general public only. For details of participants, see
electronic supplementary material, appendix S2.









sex (%) male 234 (46.8) 336 (48) 873 (48) 1199 (48)
female 266 (53.2) 364 (52) 947 (52) 1301 (52)
ages (%) 18–24 56 (11.2) 78 (11.2) 229 (12.6) 303 (12.1)
25–34 91 (18.2) 136 (19.4) 337 (18.5) 454 (18.1)
35–44 98 (19.6) 134 (19.1) 344 (18.9) 480 (19.2)
45–54 99 (19.8) 133 (19) 346 (19) 480 (19.2)
55–64 86 (17.2) 118 (16.9) 310 (17) 429 (17.2)
65+ 70 (14) 101 (14.4) 254 (14) 354 (14.2)
ethnicity (%) white 422 (84.4) 636 (90.9) 1597 (87.7) 2174 (87)
black 26 (5.2) 6 (0.9) 38 (2.1) 64 (2.6)
Asian 17 (3.4) 37 (5.3) 123 (6.8) 160 (6.4)
mixed 11 (2.2) 9 (1.3) 30 (1.6) 55 (2.2)
other 7 (1.4) 5 (0.7) 6 (0.3) 15 (0.6)
education (%) no qual 21 (4.2) 25 (3.6) 78 (4.3) 116 (4.6)
GCSE-level 116 (23.2) 163 (23.2) 407 (22.4) 578 (23.1)
A-level 140 (28) 178 (25.4) 495 (27.2) 692 (27.7)
bachelors 133 (26.6) 207 (29.6) 525 (28.8) 717 (28.7)
masters 49 (9.8) 72 (10.3) 189 (10.4) 250 (10)
doctoral 13 (2.6) 17 (2.4) 44 (2.4) 49 (2.0)
other 19 (3.8) 29 (4.1) 55 (3.0) 71 (2.9)
experience of COVID-19 confirmed infection 1 (0.2) 4 (0.6) 18 (1.0) 14 (0.6)
unconfirmed infection 77 (15.4) 99 (14.1) 275 (15.1) 373 (15.0)
no infection 422 (84.4) 597 (85.3) 1526 (83.8) 2113 (84.5)
numeracya (%) 1 19 (3.9) 47 (7) 171 (9.7) 166 (6.7)
2 59 (12.1) 67 (9.9) 177 (10) 250 (10.1)
3 80 (16.4) 100 (14.8) 280 (15.8) 363 (14.7)
4 75 (15.4) 120 (17.8) 355 (20.1) 445 (18)
5 93 (19.1) 119 (17.7) 287 (16.2) 467 (18.9)
6 93 (19.1) 121 (18) 279 (15.8) 428 (17.3)
7 24 (4.9) 40 (5.9) 83 (4.7) 137 (5.5)
8 44 (9) 60 (8.9) 138 (7.8) 217 (8.8)






































Five interviewers carried out semi-structured interviews using video call technology and, where
appropriate, screen share functions (e.g. when getting feedback on visualizations in alpha rounds).
Interviews took on average 1 h to complete (range 0.5–2.25 h). Calls were recorded and partially
transcribed by two members of the team (AL and LF). Data analysis was conducted by one member
of the team (AL) and was descriptive in nature [49]. Analysis was done by populating a table per
round of interviews with data from the partial transcriptions, whereby each question, or appropriate
groups of questions, represented a row of the table, with each column representing a participant.
Once the table had been populated, the researcher summarized each row of answers. In conjunction
with this approach, there was some use of quantitative content analysis methods [50] so the data
could more easily be used for making decisions regarding risk communication. If multiple






































weighted through the use of descriptive statistics. While undertaking the descriptive analysis, themes
were informally identified within the data. As this was a purely qualitative analysis, there was no
need to assign descriptive statistics to each theme. A formal thematic analysis [51] was not carried out
as time was limited and this was not considered a primary output of the research. Once all the
analyses for each round had taken place, it was discussed with two other team members (LF and GL).
These two other team members had either partially transcribed the interviews or had carried out their
own rapid descriptive analysis using the same populated table. Within these discussions, the
researchers identified and resolved any discrepancies between their impressions of the data, as well as
adding any missing points to the existing analyses. The alterations and additions made were minimal.
Since the discovery phase interviews with primary care physicians were carried out after the
discovery phase interviews with members of the public, they were also shown mock-up visualizations
and asked to give comments. The main questions asked during these interviews are shown in
electronic supplementary material, appendix S1 (grouped by theme).
In quantitative survey 1, participants were asked a series of questions about their information needs
(‘I would like to know now what my personal risk of dying from COVID-19 would be if I were to catch
the virus’; ‘I think that people are entitled to know now what their personal risk of dying from COVID-19
would be if they were to catch it’; ‘I would not like my employer to know my personal risk of dying from
COVID-19’; ‘I feel that I have enough information already about my personal risks from COVID-19’;
‘I would like to know by how much each personal behavioural change (e.g. wearing face masks,
washing hands) reduces my personal risk of catching the virus’; ‘I would not trust any information
about my personal risk of dying from COVID-19 as I don’t believe enough is known about it’: each
answered on a 7-point Likert scale marked from ‘completely disagree’ to ‘completely agree’ with
‘I don’t know’ marked as the mid-point). They were also asked to estimate their own chance of
catching and dying from COVID-19 on a 9-point Likert scale marked ‘not at all likely’ to ‘almost
certain’ (and asked why they rated their chance at this level in free text), and in the demographics
section were asked a series of health-related questions which allowed a rough estimation of their
actual chance of dying from COVID-19 if they caught it.3.2.1. Power calculation
Given that there were no planned statistical analyses, we based our participant numbers for survey 1 on
past experience. In our prior research [5], we found that a sample size of 700 per country was more than
adequate to characterize predictors of COVID-19 risk perception in that country. Further analysis of the
earliest UK dataset in [5] indicated that the mean value of 700 participants versus just the first 500
differed by less than a quarter of a point on every 7-point Likert item, suggesting that 500 participants
would be adequate for a descriptive study to characterize attitudes on similar topics.3.3. Results
3.3.1. Information needs
In interviews, when asked how they felt about a tool in which they would see a risk of death, and
whether it would be useful to them, participants said they would use the tool for decision-making
(e.g. relating to going to work, school, social events, travel) (11 out of 22; 50%) or out of curiosity
(‘…it would just be interesting to know if it was something you could beat, or if it would beat you.’) (7 out of
22; 32%), but recognized others might not want to as it may be anxiety-inducing (6 out of 22; 27%).
All participants felt comfortable seeing it in the context of the study.
Other information that participants mentioned being useful included: how infectious an individual
with COVID-19 is; what the treatment would be if you did catch it; how distance affects infection rate;
likelihood of hospitalization; likelihood of long-term effects; likelihood of catching it and how much
each suggested piece of mitigation advice reduces that; likelihood of transmitting it (and again,
effectiveness of preventative measures); and an idea of the likely severity of symptoms if you get it.
In the quantitative survey, we found widespread demand for personalized information on people’s
risk of dying from COVID-19 if they caught it, and their risk of catching it. A minority thought that
they would not want such information (figure 1). The majority also stated that they would want that
information in numerical form, rather than as simple ‘low, medium, high’ categories (figure 2). The




















Figure 1. The proportion of people answering 1–7 on a Likert scale ‘I think that people are entitled to know now what their

















Figure 2. Participants’ rating on a 7-point Likert scale of how much they agreed or disagreed with the statement ‘If my doctor was
going to tell me now my personal risk of dying from COVID-19 if I caught the virus, I would like to know that risk as a precise
number, rather than as a category (e.g. low, medium, high)’—asked before people had seen any mock-up showing risk as an exact






































numeracy, and to be more persuasive in terms of getting people to change their behaviour. Reasons given
against included that it might be more frightening for those who were told they were at high risk.
One of the themes identified within the interviews with primary care physicians was that of
infantilization and empowerment. Some physicians spoke strongly about how they felt the public in
the UK were being ‘infantilized’ by clinicians who implied that ‘every risk can be managed away’ and by
the government for not being honest about the risks that some socializing can bring. They also
recounted how patients ask them what they should do, wanting an authority instead of ‘the risk of
thinking for themselves’. However, they also felt it was important that patients made their own decision
about certain risks, as only the patient’s values can inform that. Additionally, one physician felt such
risk information could empower patients to ‘have those conversations with the people who are making the
decisions’, for example, employers.
Another theme recognized within the primary care physician interviews was related to conflicting
medical advice whereby the participants spoke of experiencing contention between the advice given
by the government, which they viewed as political, and the advice they wanted to give, which they
viewed as clinical.
Preferences expressed by the public in our online surveys and interviews also showed a desire for
trustworthy, personalized risk information.
During interviews, when asked to quantify risks from COVID-19, participants rarely used numbers



























































age of a healthy white male with equivalent vulnerability
using a rough approximation of the COVID-AGE algorithm of Coggon et al.
75 100
Figure 3. The ratings of personal risk of participants (on a 1–9 Likert scale) against their approximate actual risk ( presented as
‘COVID-AGE’) as calculated approximately by the algorithm by Coggon et al. [9] as a means of assessing the degree to which






































consider ‘high’ or ‘low’ risk (11 out of 22; 50%), for example, ‘the older you get the more at risk you are’ or,
low-risk individuals are ‘in good health’. However, when pushed to quantify the risk, participants gave
estimates as seen in electronic supplementary material, appendix S3.3.3.2. Personal risk perception
Overall, participants marked their worry about COVID-19 higher than their worry about any other
subject they were asked about, in line with previous findings about the perception of the UK
population around this time [5].
To get a sense of how individuals’ perceptions of dying from COVID-19 if they caught it compared
with their actual risk, we estimated the latter by applying an approximation of the online COVID-AGE
algorithm by Coggon et al. [9] to the demographic and health data provided by participants. This
approximation was necessarily imprecise as we did not collect the full breadth of health information
that the full COVID-AGE uses, but nevertheless provided a rough estimate of actual risk levels. The
correlation between perceived risk and actual risk was weak (Spearman’s ρ = 0.4), suggesting that
perceived and actual risk are not closely related (figure 3).3.3.3. Which format to present probabilities in
In interviews, 7 out of 14 (50%) participants mentioned finding frequencies hard to understand: ‘I think
it’s a lot clearer with the percentages’. I mean 190 out of 1000, I think it’s hard to imagine and felt the constant
repetition of frequencies on the visual scale they were shown contributed to this (4 out of 14; 29%): ‘It’s just all
zeros everywhere!’. Some participants also commented that, in order to understand their result given as
a frequency, they would have to convert it into a percentage (3 out of 14; 21%). Lastly, in line with
previous research findings (e.g. [25]), some participants suggested that the use of frequencies made






































3.3.4. How to provide context for the numbers
Participants in interviews were asked about several types of contextual information (the risk for a healthy
person of a specified age; the risk of other causes of death; the risk for a person with specified health
conditions and age; the risk for the individual getting the results if they did not have any health
conditions; the risk for an ‘average’ person of a specified age; what proportion of the population had
a higher or lower risk than the individual getting the result). One suggestion for context to attempt to
make a person’s ‘relative risk’ clear has been to compare an individual’s own risk with that of
someone who was ‘like them but without health conditions’ [52].
Participants found these sorts of hypothetical scenarios confusing and/or felt that they raised more
questions than they answered (7 out of 8; 88%). Those options that compared the participant’s risk of
dying from COVID-19 to dying from other causes were thought likely to be helpful but only if those
risks seemed similar enough to COVID-19: when asked if a comparison with seasonal ‘flu was useful
and understandable, 7 out of 8 (88%) said yes, while 5 out of 6 (83%) found risks of accidental injury
irrelevant and not useful. Those presentations that tried to communicate a concept that wasn’t an
absolute risk (e.g. a person’s position within a population, such as a percentile, or the number of people
who had such a risk score) were easily misunderstood as an absolute risk (e.g. ‘75% of people have a
higher risk than you’ being read as ‘you have a 75% risk’) (3 out of 8; 38%), or were felt to be confusing
(5 out of 8; 63%). Again, these concepts were difficult for participants to understand as they already had
their own individual risk in their head and were, therefore, not thinking at a population level.
3.3.5. Whether to use a logarithmic or linear scale
In the qualitative interviews, 21 out of 29 participants (72%), including health professionals, were
confused by a logarithmic scale and/or considered it to be unfairly representing the risks, for
example: ‘I don’t like the scale because it’s supposed to be a scale but it’s not TO scale! Spatially it’s not
right!, The 12% has been manipulated to look higher!’
The estimated risks of an individual dying from COVID-19 if they become infected with SARS-CoV-2
very rarely exceed 30% (or, conversely, their chance of surviving it is rarely below 70%).
If a linear scale is used it is likely that communicators will want to cut the axis and display half or less
than the full 0–100% scale. In interviews, participants felt that this was justified (6 out of 7; 86%), but
wanted it to be made clear in the visualization, and to know why the particular cut-off point was
chosen. Knowing ‘the highest risk possible’ was helpful for them to calibrate their perception of the
numerical risks, and 5 out of 7 participants (71%) with whom it was discussed again found it helpful
to have that ‘maximum risk’ presented in terms of a persona: the type of person (in terms of risk
factors such as age, health conditions, etc.) who might be at that sort of level of risk.
3.3.6. Responses to different colour schemes
In interviews, participants expressed varied opinions about a ‘traffic light’ system of green, orange and
red used to colour some mock-up scales. Those shown these colours felt this coloration was easily
understood, but 2 of the 6 participants (33%) shown the colours spontaneously added that it could be
misinterpreted: ‘The green colour could make people think that they don’t need to worry that much and not
undertake proper behaviours’. It became clear that particular colours could be interpreted as an
indication of what ‘should be’ considered high risk and what low risk. The decision over colouring,
therefore, depends on how pointedly the communicator wants to guide interpretation.
3.3.7. Emerging theme: trust
In a descriptive analysis (purely qualitative, with no descriptive statistics), we extracted emerging themes
from the interviews.
In interviews, we specifically asked the participants if they would trust an outcome from the tool, and
what would make them trust it more. Sub-themes (which were unprompted) related to trust were
identified:
3.3.7.1. Trust related to the data
Participants questioned whether the data were collected in a rigorous way, how accurate the data were






































3.3.7.2. Trust related to the source
Some participants identified the University of Cambridge logo displayed on the mock-up; knowing that
the source of the tool was a university institution that undertook research gave them trust in the outcome.
3.3.7.3. Trust related to the methods behind the results
Suggestions that the risk information was produced through careful research (indicating the high quality
of underlying evidence) affected the participants’ perceptions. One said: ‘It’s important that people know it’s
not been plucked out the air, like they think it might be, but that it’s actually based on data’.
3.3.7.4. Trust related to the medium
Referring to increasing incidences of online scams and other malicious online activity, one participant
commented: ‘People are careful these days of anything online’, going on to suggest that the inclusion of
institutional logos was particularly important in gaining people’s trust when communicating online.
3.3.8. Emerging theme: uncertainty
Uncertainty was identified as a theme within interviews, with many participants commenting that the
risk score itself was inherently uncertain. This did not seem to affect their feelings of how useful the
tool was, nor their trust in the guidance it might provide. Some participants indicated that the range
around the risk score presented in the mock-ups was superfluous, possibly because they instinctively
acknowledged the uncertainty of the result. Some also felt that the data which could be used to
calculate the risk score was uncertain. This uncertainty of the data, and whether it was accurate and
reliable, did seem to affect trust. These findings were also broadly similar within the primary care
physicians, though unlike the public, uncertainty about the risk score itself was attributed to applying
population-level data to individuals.
3.3.9. Emerging theme: worry
Throughout the general public interviews, numerous participants spoke about how the tool may worry
them or others. Many primary care physicians also commented on how the tool could have a negative
effect on the mental well-being of patients. By contrast, one primary care physician detailed how a
tool like this would empower them to talk openly with their patients who were unnecessarily
concerned, which for some had resulted in deteriorating mental health.
3.4. Interim discussion
The majority of participants clearly showed a desire for quantitative information about COVID-19 (much
of which was not, at the time of this survey, available). The comments from the primary care physicians
suggested that they viewed patients as perhaps becoming used to being given simplified instructions
rather than information on which to base their own decisions. However, the results from survey 1
implied that the majority of the public would actually appreciate being given more detailed
information on which to base their own risk decisions.
The quantitative survey emphasized that there was a clear public concern about the virus and its
potential consequences, and people’s perception of chances of themselves dying of the virus if they
caught it were not highly correlated with the actual chances as calculated from a personalized risk
calculator given the health information participants gave us, with only a weak relationship between the two.
Some of this discrepancy seemed very likely to be due to the way that most people think about ‘risks’—as
a subjective impression, not easily translated into a numerical concept [53]. Even when pushed to quantify
their feeling of risk, most members of the public in our interviews described the risk in terms of a ‘persona’
that they had in their mind to represent that level of risk: a person who embodied the major risk factors that
would exemplify that level of risk (such as age and relevant health attributes).
Given that only a minority of people in survey 1 wanted simply to be told that their risk fell into a simple
category such as ‘low’ (as well as the practical and ethical difficulties of doing that given that an absolute risk
and relative risk would need to be combined in some way), we explored possible comparators to help the
public put their own personal risk from COVID-19 into context. The most commonly suggested comparators





































described their concepts of ‘high’ and ‘low’ risks from COVID-19 in terms of imaginary people, we chose to
experiment further with the idea of these ‘personas’ as comparators (see below).
The responses to a variety of mock-up visual risk ladders also gave us insights into the likely
responses to the use of different colours. We decided not to pursue this dimension further in our
research as we deemed it likely to be highly influential in how people interpreted the numbers and
we wanted to investigate the more subtle and less persuasive cues that could be provided in a
communication. The responses also suggested that a logarithmic scale on a risk ladder could prove
misleading or untrustworthy, but we wanted to investigate that further in quantitative surveys.
Equally, the information about frequencies and percentages was in line with previous findings, but
we thought it worth quantifying the differences in perception between different numerical formats in
this particular context and range of magnitudes as the choice of format is one that communicators
need to make and would want to do so based on empirical evidence.
The other themes emerging from the interviews were useful in determining important endpoints to
measure throughout our study: levels of perceived uncertainty, perceptions of the quality of the
underlying evidence, trust (in the data itself and in the source of the data) and degree of the worry
associated with the results.pen
Sci.8:2017214. Survey 2
4.1. Introduction
Building on the knowledge gained from the first interviews and survey 1, survey 2 was designed to start
investigating the concept of ‘personas’ as a method of giving context to the risk, which had arisen as an
idea as a result of the qualitative interviews. Firstly, we wanted to investigate how giving information
about the person whose risk it was—in the form of a persona—affected the perception of that risk, and
whether this had a different influence on people’s perception of the risk than simply giving them the
context of a range of risks for an ‘average’ person of different ages which they could compare with
the numerical risk they were presented with.
In addition, we wanted to investigate how strong the influence of information about personas might
be compared with numerical information. To do this we decided to present personas alongside risk
numbers that were discordant with the description of the person (i.e. a very high-risk percentage
displayed alongside the description of someone who would naturally be perceived as being low risk
and vice versa), to see how much this affected people’s assessment of the risk.
We also wanted to quantify any potential effects of the presentation of numbers as percentages versus
frequencies, and to investigate alternative ways of putting risks into context visually. Although the
interviews had suggested that percentiles were confusing, the concept of showing a person’s absolute
risk as a position within the distribution of absolute risks across the population visually seemed a way
of getting at the same concept in perhaps a more intuitive way. We, therefore, designed an
experiment to test the influence of showing where a person lay in a population-wide distribution of risk.
4.2. Methods
Participants were asked a series of questions relating to their information needs. Since these were shared
with the concurrent survey 3, they are described and reported together in the Survey 3 section of this
manuscript. Participants were then presented with two experimental sections of the survey.
4.2.1. Experiment 2.1: interpretation of numerical risks with and without context
Each participant was shown a set of five hypothetical risk results, one after the other; the order of
presentation was randomized.
Participants were also randomized to one of 8 conditions in a 2 (format) × 4 (context) factorial design
(resulting in an overall 5 (risk level; within subjects) × 2 (format; between subjects) × 4 (context; between
subjects) mixed design). The format factor referred to the format in which participants were presented
with numeric risks: as a percentage or as a frequency. The context factor had four levels (number only;
ages; concordant; discordant), and referred to the context that participants were provided before being
asked how they would interpret a risk. The context corresponding to each level is shown in table 2.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4. The three formats tested in Experiment 2.2: each shows a 2% risk on a logarithmic scale. One shows no additional
contextual information, one shows the comparative risks of ‘average’ people of different ages, and one attempts to illustrate
the proportion of the UK population that experiences each level of risk. Please note, the risks illustrated on these visualisations
are all fictional (including the age comparators) this was made clear to participants. Please take care not to reproduce these






































participants who were randomized to view frequencies rather than percentages were shown these risks in
the format ‘x in 1000’, e.g. ‘120 in 1000’ rather than 12%).
In each case, participants were asked to give their rating of risk on a visual slider with no numerical
cues, marked only ‘very low risk’ and ‘very high risk’ at the endpoints.
4.2.2. Experiment 2.2: interpretation of visual scales with and without context
Each participant was shown a single mock-up of a hypothetical risk result alongside a visual scale.
Theywere randomized to see one of threemock-ups, each using a (logarithmic) scale illustrating the result.
The control groupsawno further information.Asecondgroupsawascalewith the risks for ‘anaverage’50-, 70-
and 85-year-old shown alongside it. The third group saw the scale with, alongside it, an illustration of the
approximate distribution of the different absolute risk percentages in the UK population (figure 4). A
logarithmic scale had to be used for this experiment because a realistic illustration of the population
distribution of riskwas impossible on a linear scale due to the very largenumberof peoplewith avery low risk.
Participants were asked to answer the following questions:
— How well did you understand the information in the mock-up? How clear is the information in the mock-up?
(both answered on 7-point Likert scales marked Not at all—completely); we intended to combine
these into an index measure of comprehension if their correlation exceeded r = 0.7.
— If the person who got this result caught COVID-19, how likely do you think it is that they would die as a
result? (answered on a 7-point Likert scale: Very unlikely; Unlikely; Somewhat unlikely; Neither
likely nor unlikely; Somewhat likely; Likely; Very likely). How would you describe the risk of this
person dying from COVID-19 if they caught it? (answered via a slider with no numerical cues: ‘very
low risk’ and ‘very high risk’ as the end points). We intended to combine these into an index
measure of cognitive risk perception if their correlation exceeded r = 0.7.
— If this result applied to you, how worried would you be? (answered on a 7-point Likert scale: Not at all
worried—Very worried). We treated this as a measure of emotional risk perception.
(Although the graphics represented the risk as ‘your estimated risk’, in all experiments for ethical reasons it






































participants’ risk, even though they were giving us information such as their age. Hence the questions were
phrased carefully to re-emphasize that the results participants were seeing were not related to them
personally. Please also note that it was incorrect of us to represent the risk at any point as ‘your risk’ as
it is only estimated on the basis of the characteristics entered and thus could never be truly personalized.)
4.2.3. Power calculation
Our power calculation for survey 2 was based on the requirements of the experiment that we felt would
produce the most actionable information for our collaborators who were producing personalized COVID-19
risk calculators, Experiment 2.2. Determining an appropriate effect size to power for is always a somewhat
subjective decision. One approach is to look at systematic reviews of the literature in the same subdomain to
see what effect sizes are typical in the published literature. In one systematic review of one-to-one risk
communication interventions in health-related contexts, the mean effect size reported was equivalent to a
Cohen’s d of 0.38—equivalent to a common language effect size (CLES) of 0.61. The CLES is sometimes
considered to be easier to interpret than Cohen’s d, and represents the probability that a data point selected
at random from one distribution will be higher than a data point selected at random from a second
distribution [54]. The authors assessed that due to publication bias, the true size of risk communication
interventions was likelier to be closer to d= 0.1–0.2 (CLES = 0.53–0.56) [55]. However, this review prioritized
behavioural measures, only quantifying effect sizes of risk perception (our primary focus) when behavioural
measures were not available. Generally speaking, the effects of experimental manipulations on risk
perception tend to be larger. For example, Portnoy et al. [56] conducted a meta-analysis of health
interventions, including interventions categorized as ‘deliberative’ (presenting factual or numeric
information, including risk calculators), ‘affective’ (interventions explicitly intended to provoke emotional
responses) and ‘decision science-based’ (e.g. interventions that changed only the format or framing of risk
information). The overall mean effect size on the perceived risk of developing health problems was d= 0.5
(95% CI 0.36–0.63), equivalent to CLES = 0.64 (95% CI 0.60–0.67). Only a manipulation’s status as a
‘deliberative’ intervention had a significant effect on effect size, being associated with higher effect sizes;
decision science-based interventions were only marginally and non-significantly negatively associated with
effect size. Ultimately, we concluded that achieving 95% power to detect an effect size of d= 0.3 (CLES =
0.58), using an alpha of 0.05, would be a reasonable approach for this series of studies. GPower was used to
determine the number of participants required for a one-way ANOVA (with three groups) at this power,
alpha and effect size. This provided an estimated sample size of 690 which we rounded up to 700. Post hoc
power analysis in GPower also suggested that 700 participants would be adequate to achieve 95% power at
the same alpha and effect size in Experiment 2.1 as long as there were not extreme levels of non-sphericity.
4.3. Results
4.3.1. Experiment 2.1
Participants’ risk ratings did appear to be influenced by the independent variables: A 5 (risk levels;
within) × 2 (format; between) × 4 (group; between) mixed three-way ANOVA revealed a significant
three-way interaction between all factors, F12,2748 = 2.56, p < 0.01, h2G ¼ 0:004, which we decomposed
by running separate 5 × 2 mixed ANOVAs within in each group. Greenhouse–Geisser corrections were
applied to correct for non-sphericity (εs 0.526–0.710). All groups showed an expected significant main
effect of risk level, which we will not examine further here for brevity, except where interactions with
other factors were detected.
In the ‘number only’ group, there was a significant main effect of numerical format, F1,183 = 11.41, p <
0.001, h2G ¼ 0:045. Tukey’s post hoc tests indicated that across all risk levels, frequencies were rated as
higher risk than the equivalent percentage (all p < 0.05).
In the group presented with ‘ages’ comparison information, we report a significant interaction
between risk level and format F2.51,440.02 = 3.78, p < 0.01, h2G ¼ 0:006. Post hoc tests revealed that
frequencies were only rated significantly higher than percentages in the 1% risk level ( p < 0.05).
In the groups presented with an individual’s description, there was no significant main effect of format
(F1,161 = 0.44, p = 0.51 in the ‘concordant’ group, F1,168 = 1.45, p = 0.23 in the ‘discordant’ group), or
interaction with the risk level. However, post hoc comparisons within the discordant group revealed a
significant difference between the frequency and per cent groups ratings of the 20% risk value (p < 0.01).
Overall, as can be seen in figure 5, the difference in risk perception between those given a risk in a
percentage compared with a frequency was diminished in the presence of additional information. It is















































risk rating—‘very low’ (0) to ‘very high’ (100)
75 100 0 25 50 75 100 0 25 50 75 100
format frequency per cent
0 25 50 75 100 0 25 50 75 100
1% 5% 12% 20%
0.1% 1% 5% 12% 20%
0.1% 1% 5% 12% 20% 0.1%
risk level













Figure 5. Means (a) (95% CI) and distributions (b) of ratings (‘very low risk’ (0) to ‘very high risk’ (100)) of five different risk levels
presented as a percentage or frequency (out of 1000), with or without additional information. Asterisks indicate a significant






































the risks (compared with the ‘no additional information’ group), and the effect of giving a description of
the risk factors of the individual was so strong that in the ‘dissonant context’ condition, a 0.1% risk (given
as the risk for an 85-year-old man with two health conditions) was judged higher than a 20% risk (given
as the risk for a 30-year-old man with no health conditions).
To examine the relationship between demographic factors and risk ratings (e.g. whether males or
older people had a lower perception of the risks), we fitted a linear model to the data from the ‘no
information group’ regressing risk ratings on risk level, age, sex and level of numeracy.
Accounting for experimental manipulations, we found no significant effect of age (β =−0.04, p = 0.15)
or sex (β =−0.04, p = 0.15) on risk ratings. Numeracy did not moderate the effect of format but did interact
with risk level, (β = 0.38, p < 0.001). Lower numeracy individuals tended to rate the risks presented as
higher risk compared with higher numeracy individuals, with this difference decreasing as the risk
level increased (see electronic supplementary material, appendix S5).4.3.2. Experiment 2.2
The correlation between the items on clarity and ease of understanding exceeded 0.7 (r695 = 0.82) and












































control age population control age
condition
population control age population
Figure 6. (a–c) Mean (95% CI) participant ratings of the three formats shown in figure 4 (risk result shown alongside: no additional
information (control), average risk for different ages (age) or risk distribution for UK population (population). ‘Violin’ plots
indicate underlying distribution. Horizontal bars indicate significant difference between conditions, p < 0.05, p < 0.001






































asking about the risk of death (r692 = 0.73), which were, therefore, combined into an index measure of
cognitive risk perception. Mean responses of participants asked to rate the visualization that they
were presented with on comprehension, cognitive risk perception and emotional risk perception are
shown in figure 6.
Cognitive risk perception was slightly decreased by giving the age comparators. A one-way ANOVA
suggested a possible difference between groups (F2,691 = 2.81, p = 0.061, h2G ¼ 0:008.1 Follow-up post hoc
testing using Tukey HSD correction for multiple comparisons showed a significant difference between
the ‘comparator by age’ (age) group and the ‘no comparator’ (control) group ( p = 0.049, d = 0.22;
CLES = 0.56). The three visualizations did not lead to a significant difference in emotional risk
perception (worry about the result). The population distribution presentation was less well
understood than the other two visualizations (F2,694 = 10.07, p < 0.001, h2G ¼ 0:028; Tukey HSD post hoc
pairwise comparisons significant for this group versus the other two, both p < 0.001: dPopulation-Age =
0.33, CLES = 0.59; dPopulation-Control = 0.37, CLES = 0.61).
2
4.4. Interim discussion
Participants’ estimates of the likelihood of death from COVID-19 were consistent with an understanding
of the major risk factors for the disease: the rank ordering of the risks of the different personas described
was in line with experts’ estimations of their risks. This has been observed previously within people’s
mental models of risks (summarized in [57]).
Higher numeracy was associated with lower risk perception, particularly as risks became lower,
which might indicate a greater familiarity with numerical risks and hence a more ‘realistic’ view of
the numbers associated with the risks in this instance.
In accordance with previous findings (e.g. [25,27,28]), the same number expressed as a frequency
(x out of 1000) was perceived as expressing a higher level of risk that when expressed as a probability.
However, the fact that the gap between the two decreased as participants were given contextual
information to the number shows the importance of this context to their perception and judgement.
The power of the persona information can be seen by its effect in the discordant condition, where the
numerical and the persona information fight each other. The density plots for this condition show
the broad spread of participants’ responses across the spectrum. However, this is also true of some of
the other conditions. For example, whereas the comparison information appeared to help people1Note that the ANOVA merely revealed a trend. However, non-parametric testing to account for the skew in the data revealed a
significant effect (Kruskal–Wallis rank sum test, p = 0.048). Therefore, post hoc analysis was performed and reported.





































assess the lowest risks, the (concordant) persona risks appeared more helpful at the higher end of risk
likelihood. This could be because it combines information about multiple risk factors (not just age, as
is given in the comparison information, but also health conditions which make clearer what the
expected magnitudes of the highest risks might be).
The results of Experiment 2.2 suggested that the graphic attempting to show an individual’s risk in
the context of the UK population distribution of risks was not clear enough. It may have been mainly a
matter of design, but the qualitative interviews suggested that the concept of switching between an
individual’s absolute risk and the population of absolute risks was confusing, so we decided not to




Survey 3 shared the initial survey elements of survey 2 (and was run concurrently) adding to our
investigation of people’s information priorities. With only a limited amount of space within a
communication, and issues of cognitive load for the audience, we were keen to start identifying what
participants considered to be the ‘core’ information and what could be included as a ‘deeper dive’.
To inform the development of a means of displaying an individual’s risk of dying from COVID-19
if they caught it, and given that a visual means of display would be helpful to test, the experiment
within survey 3 was designed to investigate, quantitatively, the potential impacts of a logarithmic
versus a linear scale on a visual risk ladder. Previous research [32] suggested that the visual
appearance of the position of a risk on a ladder can influence the perception of that risk. Since a
logarithmic scale emphasizes the lower portion of a scale and hence tends to move all but the
lowest risks up the scale, we anticipated that a logarithmic scale might affect the perception of, and
worry about, the risks. After the initial suggestions in the qualitative interviews that the logarithmic
scale may be confusing and potentially less trustworthy, we also anticipated that measures of
understanding and trustworthiness might reflect this. The experiment also investigated the potential
impacts of both percentage and frequency formats of numbers, this time as they might be presented
on a risk ladder format.
5.2. Methods
Surveys 2 and 3 both contained two questions designed to help determine information priorities. These
are described here in order to report their combined results (see electronic supplementary material,
appendix S4 for a summary of key questions in each survey).
After being shown the mock-up of a personalized risk communication tool (Experiments 2.2 and 3.1),
participants were asked how much they agreed or disagreed on a 7-point Likert scale (marked from
‘completely disagree’ to ‘completely agree’ with ‘don’t know’ labelled as the mid-point) with the
following statements: ‘I would not like my employer to know a result like this about my personal risk
from COVID-19’, and ‘I would not like to see information like this about my own risks from COVID-19’.
They were also asked:
‘Which of the following pieces of information would you most want to know about your risk, if it
were available? Please drag and drop into the order you feel puts the most important at the top: The
risk of you dying of COVID-19 if you caught it; The risk of you catching COVID-19 given where you
live and how many other cases have been reported nearby (will vary day-to-day a bit like a pollen
count); The risk of you being hospitalized by COVID-19 if you caught it; Whether you might suffer
long term complications from COVID-19 if you caught it.’
‘Please drag and drop the following into the order you feel puts the most important at the top: The
person’s risk score: the chances of that person dying if they caught COVID-19; Information about what
data was used to calculate that risk score (e.g. whether it was data from the UK, how much data the
researchers had); Information about who developed the maths behind the calculation; Information
about the certainty and precision of the risk score: how much lower or higher the actual risk for that
person could be; Context about that risk score: how it rates compared with a similar person at
different ages (e.g. “someone like you but aged 20”; “someone like you but aged 60”); Context about
that risk score: where that person’s risk lies in comparison with everyone else in the UK (e.g. a graph






































people have a higher risk than that person, and how many a lower risk); Link to where people can get
more information about things they can do to reduce their chances of catching COVID-19 (e.g. hand
washing, social distancing, wearing face masks, etc.); Information reminding people that as well as the
risk to themselves, they also pose a risk to others (in case they catch COVID-19 and pass it on);
Details about how the risk score was calculated (e.g. what factors makes someone’s risk higher or
lower, and how important each of those factors are); Information about things they can do to reduce
their chances of dying from COVID-19 if they caught it (such as losing weight).’
Additionally, participants were presented with a single experiment intended to investigate their
interpretation of logarithmic versus linear visual scales, as well as the effect of different number
formats (percentages and frequencies) in this context:
5.2.1. Experiment 3.1: interpretation of visual scales with linear and logarithmic scales/frequencies and
percentages
In Experiment 3.1, participants were randomized to one of 8 groups in a 2 (high or low risk) ×
2 (percentage or frequency) × 2 (logarithmic or linear) between-subjects design. They were shown a
risk of either 12% or 0.1%, expressed either as a percentage or a frequency, and indicated on either a
log or a linear scale (figure 7).
As in Experiment 2.2, participants were asked questions to measure their comprehension, cognitive
risk perception and emotional risk perception (worry). As described in our analysis plan (pre-
registered at https://osf.io/xpyk9), our key dependent measures were:
— Cognitive risk perception (perceived likelihood and perceived risk level): ‘If the person who got this
result caught COVID-19, how likely do you think it is that they would die as a result?’, answered
on a 7-point Likert scale, marked ‘very unlikely’ to ‘very likely’; ‘How would you describe the risk
of this person dying from COVID-19 if they caught it?’—slider with no numerical cues, very low
to very high, coded 0–100).
— Subjective comprehension of the information provided (‘How well did you understand the information
in the mock-up?’, and ‘How clear is the information in the mock-up?’; answered on a 7-point Likert
scale marked ‘not at all’ to ‘completely’).
— Emotional risk perception (worry) about COVID-19 (‘If this result applied to you, how worried would
you be?’, answered on a 7-point Likert scale marked ‘not at all worried’ to ‘very worried’).
As an exploratory measure of trustworthiness, we also asked participants the extent to which they found
the number in the mock-up: accurate, reliable and trustworthy (each answered on a 7-point Likert scale
marked ‘not at all’ to ‘very’).
More details on these measures, and others included in the survey but not reported here, can be
found in electronic supplementary material, appendix S4.
5.2.2. Power calculation
GPower was used to determine the number of participants required to provide 95% power for small to
medium-sized effects (d = 0.3, equivalent to CLES = 0.58) for the planned t-tests between subgroups in
Experiment 3, for an alpha of 0.05, adjusted to correct for multiple hypothesis tests with the
Benjamini–Hochberg procedure. This led to a sample size of 910 participants in the ‘high risk’
condition, or 1820 participants overall.
5.3. Results
5.3.1. Surveys 2 and 3: information priorities questions
In both surveys 2 and 3, participants were asked—after seeing a hypothetical result on a risk ladder,
whether they would like to see such information. More people said that they would than that they
would not. The results are shown in figure 8. When asked about their employer seeing such
information, the majority of participants chose ‘I don’t know’.
When asked what numerical risk result was most important to them, the risk of dying from COVID-19
if they caught it was ranked first. Risks of hospitalization or long-term consequences of COVID-19 were
further down people’s priority lists, although they could be made available as ‘extra information’ for
Figure 7. A 12% risk shown on a log or linear scale, in percentages or frequencies. Participants in Experiment 3.1 were randomized

























































Figure 8. The proportion of people answering 1–7 on a Likert scale ‘I would not like to see information like this about my own risks






































those who wanted it. The view from interviews, though, was that too many numbers at once would
probably be confusing.
When asked to rank possible information that could additionally be made available to them, after the
risk of dying from COVID itself, the highest-ranked pieces of information was advice on risk mitigation
strategies and details about how the score was calculated. These were followed by the request for
information reminding people that they pose a risk to others and context about that person’s risk
score in comparison with everyone else in the UK. Below that was information about the uncertainty
in the score and the data used for it (assessments of the quality of the evidence) (see figure 9).
5.3.2. Experiment 3.1
The two measures of subjective comprehension were correlated with r1595 = 0.88 and so were combined
into a single measure, as were the subjective comprehension items, r1601 = 0.74. The three measures of
trustworthiness had α = 0.95 and so were combined.
The results for these four dependent variables for the four arms of the experiment (log and linear
scales, with figures shown as percentage or frequencies on each), for the high (12%) risk result are
shown in figure 10.
We planned separate t-tests to explore differences in these key dependent variables between log and
linear presentations (pooling frequency and percentage conditions), and likewise between the frequency
and percentage conditions (pooling log and linear presentations) for the high-risk group only, correcting
for multiple comparisons with the Benjamini–Hochberg procedure. As previous literature [32] reported
that the visual positioning of the risk on the scale is influential, and we expected risks to look higher on a
logarithmic scale as a result, we planned these comparisons only for participants who saw the higher
(12%) risk result.
After adjusting for multiple comparisons, we found no significant differences between participants
who saw a 12% risk result displayed on a logarithmic versus linear scale, in terms of perceived risk
(Mlin = 38.89, s.d. = 20.36, Mlog = 40.45, s.d. = 21.27; p = 0.30), worry (Mlin = 4.10, s.d. = 1.59, Mlog = 4.28,
s.d. = 1.61; p = 0.13), subjective comprehension (Mlin = 5.70, s.d. = 1.35, Mlog = 5.58, s.d. = 1.38; p = 0.27),
or trust in the information (Mlin = 4.22, s.d. = 1.31 Mlog = 4.01, s.d. = 1.32; p = 0.06).
Considering the effect of the format of the risk presented, those who saw the numerical information in
frequency terms (120 out of 1000), compared with a percentage, perceived the risks to be significantly
higher (Mfreq = 43.30, s.d. = 21.47; Mperc = 36.18, s.d. = 19.56; p < 0.001; d = 0.35; CLES = 0.60) and less
easily understood (Mfreq = 5.46, s.d. = 1.42; Mperc = 5.81, s.d. = 1.29; p < 0.01; d = 0.26; CLES = 0.57)
(figure 10). This was in line with the other experiments in this study.
Risk format did not have a significant effect on emotional risk perception (worry) (Mfreq = 4.32, s.d. =
1.62; Mperc = 4.06, s.d. = 1.58; p = 0.06) or trust in the information (Mfreq = 4.03, s.d. = 1.37; Mperc = 4.20,
s.d. = 1.26; p = 0.13).
Out of all the information that could be available about a person’s risk, which do you
think is the most important?
the person’s risk score: the chances of
that person dying if they caught
COVID-19
information about how to reduce their
chances of dying from COVID-19 if they
caught it
information about the certainty and
precision of the risk score
information about data used to
calculate that risk score
link to more information about how to
reduce chances of catching COVID-19
context about that risk score: how it
rates compared to a similar person at
different ages
information about who developed the






details about how the risk score was
calculated
information reminding people that as
well as the risk to themselves, they
also pose a risk to others
context about that risk score: where
that person’s risk lies in comparison





Figure 9. Participants’ ranking of the importance of different pieces of information in a hypothetical personal COVID-19 risk






































The same analyses for those who saw the 0.1% risk result were not performed due to a mistake in the
graphic for this condition shown to some participants.5.4. Interim discussion
The data on the audience’s information preferences confirmed the findings of survey 1: that the majority
of people were keen to be given this kind of information (even, this time, when shown what that
information might look like). It also confirmed the importance—if only a single number were being
shown—of the risk of death if a person catches COVID-19 as the main outcome of interest.
In Experiment 3.1, the findings of the qualitative interviews were confirmed: there was a small but
significant difference in trust between logarithmic and linear scales (with the linear scales being more
trusted). However, there was no difference in subjective understanding or—surprisingly—risk
perception. This went against our expectation that the higher position of the ‘12%’ marker on the
graphical logarithmic scale compared with the linear scale would create a perception of a higher risk.
The findings that the risks expressed as a frequency out of 1000 were found to be less clear and
perceived as higher was also in keeping with previous research and the results in survey 2 (which
was run concurrently).
Together these suggested that we concentrate our design on a risk ladder with a linear axis and using
percentages rather than frequencies as the main method of communication of numbers on the axis. We
wanted to continue work on the potential comparators that were most useful, and also have a final set of
endpoints that would help us assess the communication overall in terms of Weinstein & Sandman’s
criteria [42] and communication efficacy [58]. These formed the core experiment within our final
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Figure 10. Mean risk perception (a), worry (b), subjective comprehension (c) and trust (d ) among participants responding to a high
(12%) risk result presented as either a frequency or percentage with either a linear or logarithmic scale. Error bars show 95%
confidence intervals. ‘Violin’ plots represent underlying data distribution. Asterisks denote significant difference between








































The main aim of survey 4 was to create a final experimental test of the potential formats for a
communication of an individual’s personal risk of dying from COVID-19 if they caught it.
Learning from our previous findings, we decided to use percentages as the main form of
communicating the risk, but—because of the difference in perception of percentages versus
frequencies—we also decided to include a single instance in which we ‘translated’ the percentage into
a frequency format in an attempt to help balance the audience’s perception of the number.
In order to give communicators a firm evidence base as to the effects of choosing different formats of
frequency (e.g. ‘1 in x’, which we had not previously tested) for the presentation of the range of relevant
probabilities (i.e. ranging from 0.01% to 20%) we decided to run one experiment specifically to test the
risk perception of each of four different formats: ‘x in 1000’, ‘x in 100’, ‘x%’, ‘1 in x’.
From our previous findings, it appeared that the most likely useful comparators for people to have on
a risk ladder were ‘personas’: descriptions of people who symbolized different levels of risk. To test
whether the level of description of these personas that we were considering providing was adequate
to elicit a level of risk in the minds of the audience that was as consistent as possible across
individual participants, we designed a second experiment presenting participants with persona
descriptions and asking participants to provide a numerical probability to represent the risk they






































We additionally randomized some participants to provide their answer in a percentage format and
others in a frequency format in order to elicit participants’ quantitative interpretations of the level of
risk associated with the different presentation formats (as opposed to previous experiments in which
we tested participants’ interpretations of risks that we provided quantitative information on).
Finally, as the main experiment of the survey, we set out to conduct an evaluation study to test
additional options for how the communication could be structured, specifically:
— whether a visual scale was an improvement over merely providing comparators as text;
— whether personas provided a better set of comparators over having none, or the individual’s chance
of dying from seasonal ‘flu (the only other comparator that was considered reasonable by
participants in our qualitative interviews);
— whether ‘positive framing’ (i.e. the number of people who survive rather than the number who die)
made a difference compared with the negative framing we had so far been testing.
We aimed to evaluate realistic mock-ups of these options at a range of different risk levels covering the
orders of magnitude that might be communicated in such a tool (allowing us to evaluate dose–response
consistency according to the criteria of Weinstein & Sandman [42]), according to a communication
efficiency scale based on Scheuner et al. [58], an ‘actionability’ scale modified from Recchia et al. [59],
and measures of trustworthiness, perceived risk, perceived uncertainty, subjective comprehension,
subjective liking, worry and concern about carrying out various high-risk behaviours (a collection of
endpoints informed by our qualitative interviews).
The mock-ups were designed to be ‘realistically complex’, that is, to include additional information
that such a tool would include in the real world, including (faux) links to further information based
on participants’ requests in previous surveys, information about the uncertainty around the score and
some information about the data on which the calculation was based.
In addition to these experiments, we added two more questions to survey 4 about the information
preferences of the audience. Since we were aware that—as mentioned in the main introduction—the
aim of the communicator was key to many design decisions, we were interested in where the UK
public thought the aim of such a tool should sit on the ‘inform–persuade’ spectrum.
6.2. Methods
Survey 4 started with the same risk perception and COVID-19 experience questions as the previous
surveys. Additionally, participants were asked whether they expected a public tool designed to
communicate personalized COVID-19 risks to try to persuade people to change their behaviour, or
merely to inform them, with the following question:
‘A tool like this can be designed in many different ways, which give people a different impression of
the numbers. The tool can be made as neutral as possible, to try to just inform people and let them make
up their own mind about the risk to them and how they should behave. Or the differences between
numbers can be made very obvious, making the risk look larger or smaller. This would be more
persuasive and make people more likely to change their behaviour. How do you think a national tool
should be designed?’
They were provided a 7-point Likert scale for their answers, with the endpoints labelled ‘As neutral as
possible: just inform people’—‘As persuasive as possible: change people’s behaviour’.
Participants who marked an answer on the scale past the mid-point and towards the ‘persuasive’ end
of the spectrum were then asked ‘In which direction do you think the tool should try to persuade
people?’ and given three options: ‘It should try to reassure people by showing the risk is generally
low’; ‘It should try to make people be more cautious by showing that even if the risk is low to them,
they can spread it to others’; ‘It should try to be persuasive to different people in different ways
(reassuring some and making others more cautious)’.
Participants were then presented with survey questions corresponding to three randomized
controlled experiments:
6.2.1. Experiment 4.1: elicitation of different numeric formats
Participants were presented with basic descriptions of five different individuals (the same as in
Experiment 2.1) in a randomized order and asked to estimate each individual’s chances of dying from




































‘Type a percentage, without the percentage sign’; ‘Type the number of people out of 100 exactly like
[name] you would expect to die if they all caught it.’ Or ‘Type the number of people out of 1000
exactly like [name] you would expect to die if they all caught it.’
We compared the mean estimated risk of dying (all converted to a percentage) between conditions
and personas using a 3 (response format) × 5 (persona) factorial ANOVA with Tukey HSD post hoc
comparisons. This analysis was pre-registered at https://osf.io/w2vks.lishing.org/journal/rsos
R.Soc.Open
Sci.8:2017216.2.2. Experiment 4.2: interpretation of different numeric formats
Participants were asked to imagine they had received a personalized estimate of the risk of dying if
infected with COVID-19 and were each presented with five different risk estimates in random order.
They were randomized to one of five conditions: four formats of presentation of the level of risk
(percentages, ‘1 in x’, ‘x in 100’, ‘x in 1000’ in which they were asked to respond with a sliding scale
labelled ‘very low risk’ at one end and ‘very high risk’ at the other) and one condition where they
received the risk as a percentage but were asked to respond instead on an 11-point Likert scale with
the same labelling as the slider. This was done to compare the effects of using a slider versus Likert
scale as we had some concerns that those being given numbers as a percentage might merely use the
slider scale to measure out the approximate percentage of the entire slider scale distance, rather than
to indicate the degree of risk that they perceived.
We compared mean perceived risk scores between the four presentation conditions (excluding the
exploratory response condition with the Likert scale response; between-subjects) and five risk levels
(within-subjects) using a 4 × 5 two-way ANOVA. This analysis was pre-registered at https://osf.io/rdtc4.6.2.3. Experiment 4.3: interpretation of risk information with and without context, visual scale and positive
versus negative framing
A 5 × 4 factorial design randomized participants to view one of five formats of risk presentation
(figure 11) at one of four risk levels.
The five formats were (1) positive framing, visual scale, no comparators; (2) negative framing, visual
scale, no comparators; (3) negative framing, text only, age risks as comparators; (4) negative framing,
visual scale, ‘flu risk as comparator; (5) negative framing, visual scale, age risks as comparators. The
four risk levels were 0.01%, 0.1%, 2% and 20% risk of death.
After viewing the mock-up, participants were asked the 13-question communication efficacy scale
(electronic supplementary material, appendix S4), the five-question actionability scale (electronic
supplementary material, appendix S4).
They were asked three questions about the perceived accuracy, trustworthiness and reliability of the
numeric information as previously used in Experiments 2.2 and 3.1 (electronic supplementary material,
appendix S4). We planned to combine the three answers, if Cronbach’s alpha was acceptable, into an
index to describe the trustworthiness rating of the information. Trust in the producers of the information
was measured via a single item (‘To what extent do you think that the people responsible for
producing this number are trustworthy?’ answered on a 7-point Likert scale marked ‘not very
trustworthy’ to ‘very trustworthy’).
Participants were asked a single question about the perceived uncertainty of the information (‘To what
extent do you think that the result was certain or uncertain?’ answered on a 7-point Likert scale marked
‘very certain’ to ‘very uncertain’).
As a measure of cognitive risk perception, they were asked ‘If the person who got this result caught
COVID-19, how likely do you think it is that they would die as a result?’ and ‘How would you
describe the risk of this person dying from COVID-19 if they caught it?’, both answered via a slider
with no numerical cues and ‘very low risk’–‘very high risk’ as the endpoints. We intended to combine
these two into a single index if they correlated well enough.
As a measure of emotional risk perception, they were asked the same question about worry as in
previous experiments (electronic supplementary material, appendix S4).
We also asked participants to complete two questions capturing objective comprehension of the
information presented, while still viewing the information: ‘Approximately what percentage of people
who got a result like this would you expect to die of COVID-19 if they caught it?’ and ‘Out of 10 000
people who got a result like this, how many would you expect to die of COVID-19 if they caught it?’
Responses to both were recorded as a number typed into a box. In the positive framing condition,
(1) (2) (3)
(4) (5)
Figure 11. Visualization formats shown to participants in Experiment 4.1 (2% risk level category only). (1) positive framing, visual
scale, no comparators; (2) negative framing, visual scale, no comparators; (3) negative framing, text only, age risks as comparators;
(4) negative framing, visual scale, ‘flu risk as comparator; (5) negative framing, visual scale, age risks as comparators. Planned
contrasts were pre-registered between the following pairs of formats: (1, 2), (3, 5), (1, 3), (1, 4), (1, 5), for each dependent
variable: risk perception, worry, communication efficacy and concern about higher-risk behaviours. Please note, the risks
illustrated on these visualisations are all fictional (including the age comparators) this was made clear to participants. Please






































these items were reframed as asking the percentage/frequency of people expected to survive rather than
die, so as to match the information provided. The answers to these questions were directly available in







































To assess hazard–response consistency, participants were asked: ‘If this result applied to me I’d be more
concerned about my risk from COVID-19 than from seasonal ‘flu’ (answered on a 7-point Likert scale:
Completely disagree–Completely agree).
In order to assess their concern over high-risk behaviours, another way to try to assess their risk
perception, participants were asked ‘How worried would you feel doing each of the following
because of the risk of catching or passing on coronavirus at the moment?’ prior to viewing the mock-
up and ‘If you had received the result you just saw, how worried would you feel doing each of the
following because of the risk of catching or passing on coronavirus right now?’ after viewing the
mock-up: ‘Shopping in a busy supermarket; Eating indoors in a restaurant with a small group of
friends; Drinking in a pub garden with a small group of friends; Going to a large cinema; Travelling
on the London underground; Visiting an elderly person in a nursing home; Attending Accident and
Emergency in a city hospital’. These options were presented in random order and answered via
7-point Likert scales (labelled ‘not at all worried’ to ‘very worried’).
After viewing the mock-up, participants were also asked how much they agreed or disagreed with
the statement ‘I think the tool should just tell people whether their risk is “high” or “low”’ (answered
on a 7-point Likert scale marked ‘completely disagree’ to ‘completely agree’).
Finally, participants were shown all five mock-ups, and asked to rank them, as a measure of subjective
preference.
For a full list of question wordings and other questions asked but not reported here, see electronic
supplementary material, appendix S4.
We ran four regression models in which perceived likelihood of death, worry, communication efficacy
and concern about higher-risk behaviours were the dependent variables. In each, the independent
variables were display format (using sum coding) and risk level (treated as a continuous variable).3
We also conducted pairwise planned contrasts between different pairs of display formats for all four
DVs, with independent variables as above. These analyses were pre-registered at https://osf.io/
4yu73.4 Exploratory analyses also investigated cognitive risk perception in more detail,
trustworthiness, perceived uncertainty, hazard–response consistency, and objective comprehension.6.2.4. Power calculation
Our power calculation for survey 4 was based on the experiment contained within it with the largest
number of conditions and hence power requirements, Experiment 4.3, and we confirmed that
powering for this experiment would provide equivalent or better power for the other experiments in
the survey.
GPower was used to determine the number of participants needed in order to have 95% power to
detect a small-to-medium effect size (d = 0.3, equivalent to CLES = 0.58) at alpha 0.05 for the main
analyses and the pairwise planned contrasts. As we intended to use the Benjamini–Hochberg
procedure to control the familywise error rate, we powered so as to be able to detect an effect of this
size even for the most stringently corrected test of the 24 tests planned (tests of the main effect of
display format on risk perception, worry, subjective clarity and behavioural intentions, plus the 20
planned contrasts). A total of 2495 subjects was found to be needed for the survey as a whole, which
we rounded up to 2500.6.3. Results
When asked their opinions on whether the aim of personal risk communication about COVID-19 should
be as neutral as possible just to ‘inform people’ or whether the aim should be to ‘persuade people’ in
order to change their behaviour, 63% of participants chose a mark on the Likert scale above the half-
way point towards the tool being ‘persuasive’. When this subset of participants were asked in which
direction they wanted it to persuade people, 61% said that ‘it should try to make people be more
cautious by showing that even if the risk is low to them, they can spread it to others’.3As perceived likelihood of death increased with risk level in a linear fashion, we treated risk level as a continuous variable rather than
as a categorical variable. Treating risk level as a categorical variable led to the same pattern of results.
4In this paper, ‘perceived likelihood of death’ refers to the measure described in the pre-registration as ‘risk perception’,
‘communication efficacy’ refers to the measure described as ‘subjective clarity’ and ‘concern about higher-risk behaviours’ refers to






















Figure 12. Participants’ rating on a 7-point Likert scale of how much they agreed or disagreed with the statement that a personal
risk communication tool ‘should just tell people whether their risk is high or low’—asked after people had seen a mock-up of















percentage x in 1000
x in 100
Mel is a white man aged 30
with no underlying
health conditions
Ali is a mixed race man
aged 30 with two underlying
health issues
Jo is a white woman aged 40
with a high BMI and under-
going cancer treatment
Alex is a black woman
aged 75 with some
underlying health issues
Sam is an Asian man
aged 85 with a heart
condition and diabetes
percentage x in 1000
x in 100
percentage x in 1000
x in 100
percentage x in 1000
x in 100
response format
percentage x in 1000
x in 100
Figure 13. Mean (95% CI) estimates of different personas’ risk of dying if infected with COVID-19. Participants provided their
estimate as either a percentage, or a frequency out of 100 (x in 100) or 1000 (x in 1000); converted to percentage for
comparison. Violin plots indicate underlying distribution. For each persona, all mean estimates differed significantly from each






































When asked, after seeing the mock-up risk ladder showing them their individual score in a
realistically complex display, participants were rather more divided on whether they would rather
have just been told their score was ‘high’ or ‘low’ (figure 12).
6.3.1. Experiment 4.1
Participants were given the descriptions for five fictional personas in a randomized order and asked to
estimate their risk of dying from COVID-19 if they caught it. The mean estimates that participants gave
for the risk of each described persona, depending on the format they were asked to give their estimates
in, are shown in figure 13.
As per our pre-registered analysis, we first conducted a two-way mixed ANOVA comparing
participants’ estimates of a hypothetical individual’s risk of dying across the three response formats
(between factor) and five personas (within factor).
This revealed a significant interaction (F8,8824 = 39.56, p < 0.001, h2G ¼ 0:01). One-way ANOVAs
revealed a significant effect of response format for all personas (Fs2,2260 = 69.55–175.30, all p < 0.001),
but this effect was more pronounced for personas with descriptions that included more risk factors
and hence higher estimated risks; the effect of format was greatest for Sam (h2G ¼ 0:14; see full
descriptions in figure 13 and electronic supplementary material, appendix S4) and Alex (h2G ¼ 0:13)
compared with Jo, Ali and Mel (h2Gs 0.12, 0.11 and 0.06, respectively). Post hoc analyses using Tukey’s
HSD revealed that risk estimates differed significantly between all response formats, with individuals
percentage x in 1000
x in 100 1 in x 1 in x 1 in x 1 in x 1 in x
percentage x in 1000
x in 100
percentage x in 1000
x in 100
percentage x in 1000
x in 100
risk format
percentage x in 1000
x in 100
100











Figure 14. Mean (95% CI) ratings (from ‘very low risk’ (0) to ‘very high risk’ (100)) of five different COVID-19 infection fatality risk
figures, presented as either a percentage or as one of three frequency formats. Violin plots indicate underlying distribution. Dotted







































who entered their estimate as a percentage, on average, estimating a higher risk of death for each persona
than those who gave their estimate as a frequency out of 100. In turn, estimates provided as a frequency
out of 1000 were on average lower than those given in the percentage or ‘out of 100’ conditions (all p <
0.01).
In sum, when asked to estimate a hypothetical individual’s risk of death from COVID-19, people, on
average, gave the lowest estimates when asked to provide the figure as a frequency out of 1000, higher if
out of 100, and the highest estimates if asked to provide the figure as a percentage, and these differences
appear greater when the individual in question can be considered generally ‘high risk’.6.3.2. Experiment 4.2
To investigate how participants would perceive a range of realistic absolute risks of dying from COVID-19
(if infected), and to quantify the effects of numerical format, participants were asked to rate five different
numerical risks (presented to them in a random order) on a sliding scale marked only ‘very low risk’
and ‘very high risk’ at the extremes. The position of the slider was coded as 0–100 by the survey
software.
Means and distributions of participants’ ratings of the risks are shown in figure 14.
As per our pre-registered analyses, we conducted a mixed 5 (risk level; within) × 4 (risk format;
between) ANOVA. We report a significant interaction between conditions, F12,7048 = 15.09, p < 0.001,
h2G ¼ 0:01. One-way ANOVAs comparing perceived risk across formats for each risk level all returned
a significant effect of format (Fs3,1762 = 34.7–122.58, all p < 0.001). The effect of format was greatest for
ratings of the 5% risk level condition (h2G ¼ 0:17) followed by 12% (h2G ¼ 0:14), 1% (h2G ¼ 0:12), 20%
(h2G ¼ 0:12) then 0.1% (h2G ¼ 0:06).
Post hoc comparisons using Tukey’s HSD revealed a consistent pattern across all risk levels: risk
ratings, on average, were highest for risk levels presented in a ‘1 in x’ format, followed by ‘x in 1000’,
‘x in 100’, then percentages. Mean ratings for nearly all formats in each risk level condition differed
significantly from each other ( ps < 0.05). The exception to this was the differences between the ‘x in
100’ and ‘x in 1000’ formats in the 20% and 1% risk level conditions, which were not statistically
significant.
At risks higher than 0.1%, the absolute difference between format condition means appeared
relatively consistent. For example, across all four of the higher risk levels, the average response in ‘x in
100’ condition was about 10% points higher than the percentage condition (Mdiff range: 9.0–11.3).
Similarly, the mean responses in the ‘x in 1000’ condition were around 13% points higher than the
percentage condition (10.8–16.5), and the ‘1 in x’ condition mean scores were approximately 30%
points higher than the percentage condition (28.7–34.0).
The exploratory condition using an 11-point Likert scale as a response format gave results not
significantly different to the comparable condition using a slider response format except in the highest
(20%) risk condition (electronic supplementary material, appendix S5).
Levene’s test of variance equality indicated variances differed significantly between formats for

























Figure 15. Mean (95% CI) actionability ratings for the five formats tested in Experiment 4.3. Violin plots indicate underlying






































lower variance of risk ratings among participants viewing percentage formats compared with frequency.
Variances did not differ significantly between formats in the 12% (F3,1762 = 2.17, p = 0.08) and 20% risk
levels (F3,1762 = 0.79, p = 0.50). See electronic supplementary material, appendix S5 for a table of
pairwise comparisons.
6.3.3. Experiment 4.3
Following our pre-registration, we fitted regressions with display format and risk level as independent
variables to look for effects on the perceived likelihood of death, emotional risk perception, concern
about higher-risk behaviours and communication efficacy, as well as planned contrasts comparing five
pairs of mock-ups. After alpha adjustment, we found no main effect of format on emotional risk
perception nor on communication efficacy, but did find main effects of format on concern about
higher-risk behaviours and perceived likelihood of death. The main effects are reported in full in the
corresponding subsections.
None of the planned contrasts found significant differences. However, the stringency of our pre-
registered correction procedure may have caused us to miss true effects. In cases where uncorrected
contrasts found differences, this is also mentioned in the following sections, along with the results of
post hoc tests and exploratory analyses.
6.3.3.1. Communication efficacy
We found no main effect of format on communication efficacy, F4,2217 = 2.1, p = 0.08, h2G ¼ 0:004.
Uncorrected contrasts suggested that the negatively framed scale with no comparator risk information
scored modestly better on communication efficacy (M = 3.27, s.d. = 0.60) than the versions of the scale
that added comparisons with individuals of different ages (M = 3.17, s.d. = 0.60), p = 0.02, or with the
‘flu (M = 3.16, s.d. = 0.66), p = 0.01.
6.3.3.2. Actionability
Possible scores on the actionability measure could range from 1 to 7. The formats did not appear to differ
in actionability; the largest and smallest means were 5.07 and 4.85, respectively (figure 15). For context,
this means that on average, participants answered questions such as ‘How clear are you about what
actions you could take if you had received this result in real life?’, ‘Do you feel you would have the
necessary information to decide what actions to take if you had received this result in real life?’, and
so on (full list in electronic supplementary material, appendix S4) with answers that were somewhat
closer to ‘completely’ than to ‘not at all’.
6.3.3.3. Trust
Perceived trustworthiness was measured via an index including perceived accuracy, trustworthiness and


































0.01% 0.1% 2% 20% 0.01% 0.1% 2% 20% 0.01%
risk level
trust in information trust in producers uncertainty
0.1% 2% 20%
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 16. Mean (95% CI) ratings of trust in the information (a), trust in the producers of the information (b) and perceived
uncertainty (c) (collapsed across all five formats tested in Experiment 4.3) for each of the four risk levels indicated. Jittered
points indicate underlying distribution. Horizontal bars indicate significant difference between conditions, p < 0.05, p <






































analysis, we did not find any significant differences between formats in either perceived trustworthiness
of the information nor trust in the producers of the information.
Comparing effects for the various risk levels, however, revealed a significant effect for trust in the
information (F3,2219 = 4.87, p= 0.002, h2G ¼ 0:007). Tukey HSD post hoc testing revealed trust being
significantly lower for the 20% risk level compared with the 0.01% risk level (p= 0.003, d= 0.22, CLES =
0.56) as well as compared with the 0.1% risk level (p= 0.015, d= 0.18, CLES = 0.55) (figure 16a). Trust in
the producers of the information showed a similar descriptive trend with trust decreasing with increasing
risk levels; however, no significant differences were observed (figure 16b). There were no interactions
between format and risk level for either perceived trust in the information, nor trust in the producers.6.3.3.4. Perceived uncertainty
There was a positive relationship between risk level and perceived uncertainty of the result; the higher
the risk, the higher the perceived uncertainty (F3,2219 = 19.38, p < 0.001, h2G ¼ 0:026). Differences were
significant between all groups, except the two at the edges, i.e. 0.01% versus 0.1% and 2% versus 20%
( p range: <0.001–0.043; d range: 0.15–0.44; CLES range: 0.54–0.62) (figure 16c). This reflects the relative
sizes of the uncertainty intervals illustrated, which increased with the size of the absolute risk
portrayed: 0.01% (0–0.03%); 0.1% (0.01–0.3%); 2% (1–3%); 20% (11–23%).
When contrasting the comparable positively and negatively framed visualizations (1 and 2 in
figure 11) people perceived information in the negatively framed condition as more uncertain (M =
3.32, s.d. = 1.33) than in the positively framed condition (M = 3.09, s.d. = 1.32, t888.52 =−2.66, p = 0.008;
d = 0.18; CLES = 0.55). See figure 17. No other comparisons were significant.6.3.3.5. Risk perception
We looked at the relationship between the measures of cognitive and emotional risk perception (rescaled
from 1–7 to 0–100), described in electronic supplementary material, appendix S4. These were well-
correlated (r2215 = 0.81). A Levene median test indicated unequal variances (F1,4437 = 59.8, p < 0.001),
with emotional risk perception—worry about the result—(M = 39.7, s.d. = 30.6) having a greater
variance than cognitive risk perception (M = 28.1, s.d. = 26.2).
Perceived likelihood of death. There was a main effect of format on perceived likelihood of death,
F4,2214 = 3.9, p = 0.004, h2G ¼ 0:007. Tukey HSD tests suggested that the perceived likelihood of death
was lower for those viewing the positively framed scale (M = 2.55, s.d. = 1.75) than for those viewing
text only (M = 2.90, s.d. = 1.67), p = 0.01.
Cognitive risk perception. Cognitive risk perception showed a weak but significant inverse correlation

















Figure 17. Mean (95% CI) ratings of the perceived uncertainty of the information presented in a positively framed and a negatively






































correlations with numeracy (r2195 =−0.32, p < 0.001), with more numerate participants perceiving less
risk, as in our earlier experiments.
Emotional risk perception.We found no main effect of format on emotional risk perception, F4,2216 = 2.2,
p = 0.07, h2G ¼ 0:004. Emotional risk perception also did not show a correlation with age, but did show an
inverse correlation with numeracy (r2199 =−0.21, p < 0.001), once again with more numerate participants
perceiving less risk.
Exploratory regressions. The overall perception of risk associated with COVID-19 as reported prior to the
experiment (assessed using an index from [5]) predicted both cognitive and emotional risk perception when
entered into a regression with several covariates: sex, format, risk level, age and numeracy. Even without
taking covariates into account, males perceived a lower level of overall risk from COVID-19 (M = 4.77,
s.d. = 1.04) prior to the experiment than women did (M = 5.08, s.d. = 0.93), t2221 =−7.27, p < 0.001. Sex,
age, numeracy and prior COVID-19 risk perception were, therefore, included as predictors in a set of
exploratory regressions reported in electronic supplementary material, appendix S7; the format scale,
negative, no comparison was treated as the reference level. Multicollinearity was not likely to be a major
issue, as no variables in the model had correlations of greater than 0.43 and all variance inflation factors
(VIFs) were less than 1.6.
The use of this relatively simple condition as the reference level allowed us to explore the potential
effect of adding an age comparison (electronic supplementary material, appendix S7, row 1), a ‘flu
comparison (row 2), switching from a positive to a negative scale (row 3), or replacing the visual scale
with a textual list of age comparisons (row 4) on various dependent variables. For example, column 1,
row 4 indicates that being shown the risks with the textual list of age comparisons rather than the
visual scale predicted higher cognitive risk perception, as compared with the reference level.
Analogous analyses on five other dependent variables (electronic supplementary material, appendix
S7, final five columns) suggested that risk level was predictive of increasing concern in four of them.
Specifically, it predicted less agreement with ‘If this result applied to me, I would not be worried
about catching COVID-19’ (β =−0.06, p < 0.001), more agreement with ‘If this result applied to me,
I would likely be anxious and it might affect my mental health’ (β = +0.06, p < 0.001), more agreement
with ‘If this result applied to me, I would do everything I could to avoid catching the virus’ (β =
+0.04, p < 0.001), and more agreement with ‘If this result applied to me I’d be more concerned about
my risk from COVID-19 than from seasonal ‘flu’ (β = +0.07, p < 0.001). We found a slightly
counterintuitive result that higher risk levels predicted more agreement with ‘If this result applied to
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Likewise, we found that increased risk level was predictive of increased emotional risk perception (β =
1.49, p < 0.001), as was male sex (β = 2.89, p < 0.05) and high prior overall perception of the risk associated
with COVID-19 (β = 6.96, p < 0.001). Higher levels of numeracy were predictive of decreased emotional
risk perception (β =−3.53, p < 0.001).
Although no particular display format predicted responses on ourmeasure of emotional risk perception,
the exploratory regressions on the five ‘If this result applied tome…’ questions from the previous paragraph
suggested that having been shown the display with the positive rather than negative framing predicted less
concern overall. Specifically, having been shown the positive framing predicted more agreement with ‘If this
result applied tome, Iwouldnotbeworriedabout catchingCOVID-19’ (β = 0.39,p < 0.01), lessagreementwith
‘If this result applied tome, Iwould likelybeanxiousand itmight affectmymentalhealth’ (β =−0.36,p < 0.01),
and lessagreementwith ‘If this result applied tome I’dbemore concernedaboutmyrisk fromCOVID-19 than
from seasonal ‘flu’ (β =−0.25, p < 0.05). Betas on the remaining two questions were not significant in either
direction (electronic supplementary material, appendix S7).
6.3.3.6. Objective comprehension
The proportion of participants correctly reporting the risk level presented in the information (both as a
percentage and a frequency) varied across format and risk level. The percentage of participants correctly
answering each of the two questions, across formats and risk levels are shown in figure 18.
For each of the two comprehension items, we conducted a logistic regression with risk level and
format as predictors of the log-odds of a correct response, with the text-only format and 0.01% risk
level as reference categories.
Considering correct responses to the percentage question (asking participants to report the percentage
of expected to die—or survive, in the positive format conditions—presented in the information): we find
that participants presented with the graphical scale showing a comparison with the risk from ‘flu were
significantly more likely to provide a correct response relative to those getting the text-only format (OR =
1.79, 95 CI [1.07–3.04], p = 0.028. There were no other main effects of format.
Participants presentedwithhigher risk levelsweremore likely to provide a correct response [OR0.1% = 1.05
[0.61–1.80], p = 0.027; OR2% = 3.12 [1.85–5.32], p < 0.001; OR20% = 3.53 [2.10–6.01], p < 0.001). We note one
significant interaction, between the ‘flu risk comparison format and the 0.1% risk level (OR= 0.47 [0.22–






































diminished.A similar interactionwasdetected for the age comparison format and 0.1% risk level, though this
was not significant. Full regression results are reported in electronic supplementary material, appendix S6.
Considering correct responses to the frequency question (asking participants to report the number,
out 10 000 people, expected to die/survive presented in the information), we find that participants
presented with a positively framed graphical scale with no comparators were less likely to provide a
correct response relative to the text-only format (OR = 0.52, 95 CI [0.31–0.86], p = 0.011. There were no
other main effects of format or risk level.
We note one significant interaction between the positively framed graphical scale with no
comparators and the 20% risk level (OR = 2.11 [1.03–4.34], p = 0.041) such that the 20% risk level
(relative to the 0.01% reference category) appeared to have a greater effect in this format.
Exploratory regressions. In addition to the regressions described above, we also conducted two
exploratory logistic regressions predicting objective comprehension (as percentages and as frequencies,
respectively) using the same covariates and reference levels as the exploratory regressions previously
reported in the section on risk perception; these are reported in full in electronic supplementary material,
appendix S8. In these regressions, numeracy was predictive of higher comprehension (percentages: OR =
1.77 [1.67–1.90], p < 0.001; frequencies: OR = 1.79 [1.68–1.90], p < 0.001), as was age (percentages: OR=
1.01 [1.00–1.01], p < 0.05; frequencies: OR = 1.01 [1.01–1.02], p< 0.01) and prior COVID-19 risk perception
(significant for frequencies only: OR = 1.12 [1.01–1.23], p< 0.05). Factors predictive of lower
comprehension were having been shown the scale with positive framing (percentages: OR= 0.74 [0.55–
0.99], p < 0.05; frequencies: OR = 0.50 [0.37–0.68], p< 0.001), having been shown the scale with the
influenza comparison (significant for frequencies only, OR = 0.72 [0.53–0.98], p < 0.05) and male sex
(percentages: OR = 0.73 [0.60–0.90], p< 0.01; frequencies: OR = 0.62 [0.50–0.76], p< 0.001).6.3.3.7. Concern about high-risk behaviours
There was a main effect of format on concern about higher-risk behaviours, F4,2217) = 4.7, p < 0.001,
h2G ¼ 0:008. Uncorrected planned contrasts suggested that those viewing the positively framed scale
felt less concern about engaging in higher-risk behaviours (M = 4.61, s.d. = 1.54) than those viewing
the corresponding negatively framed scale (M = 4.89, s.d. = 1.63), p = 0.008. Tukey HSD tests also
suggested that that concern about higher-risk behaviours was lower for those viewing the positively
framed scale than those viewing either text only (M = 5.02, s.d. = 1.53), p = 0.001, or the age
comparison scale (M = 4.89, s.d. = 1.63), p = 0.03.
Participants reported at the start of the survey how worried they would be about engaging in seven
different behaviours on account of the risk of catching or passing on coronavirus (e.g. scale ‘not at all
worried’ (1) to ‘very worried’ (7)) (figure 19).
After being randomized to view one of the five visual mock-ups, participants were asked to indicate
how worried they would be about the same behaviours if they had received the risk result communicated
to them by the mock-up (either a 0.01%, 0.1%, 2% or 12% chance of dying if infected).
Adopting a pre–post design, we created an index of responses to the seven items before and after the
presentation of the mock-up (pre α = 0.91; post α = 0.94) and collapsed scores across the different
presentation formats to investigate the impact of just the risk level communicated.
A 2 (pre–post; within) × 4 (risk level; between) mixed ANOVA revealed a significant interaction
between time point and risk level, F3,2493 = 63.71, p < 0.001, h2G ¼ 0:001. Paired t-tests examining the
difference between pre and post scores for each risk level (with Benjamini–Hochberg correction)
indicated that participants who viewed a 20% risk result reported they would be more worried had
they received that result (M = 5.23, s.d. = 1.41), than their actual level of worry reported prior to the
experiment (M = 4.71, s.d. = 1.43; t628 =−12.48, p < 0.001, d =−0.50; CLES = 0.60). For participants who
viewed a 2% risk result, there was no significant difference in terms of worry scores before and after
the experiment (Mpre = 4.90, s.d. = 1.41; Mpost = 4.93, s.d. = 1.52; t624 =−0.72, p = 0.47). For participants
who viewed a 0.1% risk, reported level of worry, given the result, was lower than that reported prior
to the experiment (Mpre = 4.68, s.d. = 1.53; Mpost = 4.86, s.d. = 1.40; t622 = 4.09, p < 0.001, d = 0.16, CLES =
0.53). A similar effect was seen for participants who viewed a 0.01% result (Mpre = 4.78, s.d. = 1.48;
Mpost = 4.52, s.d. = 1.59; t619 = 5.39, p < 0.001, d = 0.22, CLES = 0.55) (figure 20).
To summarize, on average participants said they would be more worried than they currently are if
they were told they had a 20% chance of dying if infected with COVID-19. Conversely, if they were
told they had 0.1% or 0.01% chance of dying, they would be less worried than they currently are.
How worried would you feel doing each of the following because of
the risk of catching or passing on coronavirus at the moment?
travelling on the London
underground
going to a large cinema
visiting an elderly person
in a nursing home
attending accident and
emergency in a city hospital
shopping in a busy supermarket
eating indoors in a restaurant
with a small group of friends
drinking in a pub garden with











Figure 19. Distribution of participants’ ratings of how worried they would be (on a 7-point Likert scale) to carry out each kind of
behaviour because of the risk of catching or passing on coronavirus (UK participants, July 2020, asked before having seen any risk


















Figure 20. Mean actual worry before ( pre) and hypothetical worry after ( post) receiving risk result. Error bars represent 95% CI.







































When communications are evaluated on this measure, ‘the goal of the communication is usually to help
people see that one hazard is a considerably greater or smaller risk than another’ [42, p. 110]. To get a
sense of whether hazard–response consistency was present, we asked participants to what extent they
were more concerned with catching COVID-19 than seasonal ‘flu.
In an exploratory analysis, we found no significant difference between the responses on any of our
independent variables of those who were shown the comparative risk of seasonal ‘flu (M = 4.59, s.d. =
1.93) and those who were shown the same visualization without this comparison (M = 4.41, s.d. =
1.94), t896 = 1.397, p = 0.2; agreement was high in both cases. Similarly, seeing the comparative risk of
seasonal ‘flu was not predictive of responses to this question in the exploratory regression on this
dependent variable (electronic supplementary material, appendix S7).
with people of different
ages on the scale
showing the chance of
survival, not dying
with the risk of ‘flu
on the scale
text instead of a scale






Figure 21. Participants’ preferences across the five presentation formats tested in Experiment 4.3 when shown all five and asked to







































When participants were shown all five visual format options and asked to rank them in order of
preference, the formats with visual scales were clearly preferred (figure 21).
6.3.3.10. Additional findings from exploratory regressions
In exploratory regressions (electronic supplementary material, appendix S7), higher levels of numeracy
predicted higher ratings of communication efficacy (β = 0.03, p < 0.001), lower ratings of actionability
(β =−0.04, p < 0.05), higher ratings of subjective clarity (β = 0.12, p < 0.001) and subjective
comprehension (β = 0.17, p < 0.001). Not surprisingly, then, higher numeracy participants generally
found the formats easier to read and understand. Increased age was predictive of higher ratings of
communication efficacy (β = 0.003, p < 0.001), actionability (β = 0.01, p < 0.01).
Additionally, higher risk levels were very slightly but significantly predictive of lower ratings of
communication efficacy (β =−0.01, p < 0.001) and actionability (β =−0.01, p < 0.001), perhaps
suggesting that participants who were shown high levels of risk found the tool to be marginally less
helpful; they also showed greater objective comprehension on ‘percentage’ questions (β = 0.05, p <
0.001), perhaps indicating that individuals shown very low probabilities had difficulty expressing
these low probabilities as percentages.
6.4. Interim discussion
The majority of the UK population wanted a tool giving people their personalized risk from COVID-19 to
be persuasive, so that it would make others more cautious in their behaviour. This is against a backdrop
of high levels of concern about the virus that we saw in the answers to the four surveys we carried out
during the term of this study, and previously [5].
When given five different personas and asked to rate the chances of each person dying if they caught
COVID-19 (as a percentage, as a frequency out of 100 or as a frequency out of 1000) in Experiment 4.1, it
was clear that although people broadly recognized the main risk factors, as our interviews had
suggested, they estimated fatality rates to be very high. As suggested in previous literature,
frequencies appeared to represent higher risks to people than percentages (and ‘x out of 1000’ higher
than ‘x out of 100’)—in this case shown by participants who were asked to rate the chance of death in
percentage points inputting a higher fatality rate than those who were asked to rate the chance as a
frequency (as each percentage point appeared to convey a lesser sense of increased risk than each
additional single person ‘out of 100’ in the frequency format and so participants needed to input a
higher percentage to convey the same level of risk).
Experiment 4.2 confirmed the elicitation experiment reported above, and revealed that the ‘1 in x’
format is consistently rated as conveying a greater risk than the others we tested, for the range of values
explored. Note that when rating how they perceived a risk of 1%, those in the ‘x in 100’ and ‘1 in x’
presentation conditions were both presented with the risk ‘1 in 100’, and yet rated it, on average, very
differently. This is an effect of context—comparison with other risks they were presented with within






































saw the 1% value first was analysed (removing contextual effects), there was no difference between the
ratings of that value by those who were randomized to the ‘x in 100’ and the ‘1 in x’ groups. The fact
that the variance around the answers of those rating the risks displayed as a percentage was lower than
those rating them as a frequency does lend credence to the idea that these participants were perhaps
using the answer slider as a 0–100 number line (even though it was not explicitly labelled), and hence
were judging the percentage as a distance along this line. However, the response of participants using a
Likert scale rather than a slider was comparable, and the reverse (elicitation) method used in
Experiment 4.1 was also designed to counteract that potential effect and also showed frequency
presentations to convey a greater sense of likelihood, giving us confidence that this is a robust finding.
Experiment 4.3 was the culmination of our study, in which we hoped both to evaluate the
effectiveness of our overall design in communicating an individual’s risk, and also to determine the
effects of a few remaining key design decisions.
Weinstein & Sandman [42] suggested a number of criteria that should help define effective risk
communication: objective comprehension, agreement with recommendations/advice, dose–response
consistency, hazard–response consistency, uniformity in response, audience evaluation (subjective
measures) and a regard for types of failure of the communication and how acceptable those might be.
The findings of Experiment 4.3 can be used to assess our mock-ups according to those criteria:
(1) Objective comprehension: When assessed by asking the question ‘Approximately what percentage of
people who got a result like this would you expect to die of COVID-19 if they caught it?’, our
primary analysis (electronic supplementary material, appendix S7) did not find that positive
framing condition was a significant predictor relative to the text-only negatively framed condition,
though exploratory logistic regressions including further independent variables (electronic
supplementary material, appendix S8) did find that viewing the positive scale predicted poorer
comprehension as compared with the negatively framed visual scale. When assessed by asking
the question ‘Out of 10 000 people who got a result like this, how many would you expect to die
of COVID-19 if they caught it?’, participants were less likely to provide a correct response if they
had viewed the positively framed visual scale than if they had viewed the (negatively framed)
text format (electronic supplementary material, appendix S6), or the negatively framed visual
scale (electronic supplementary material, appendix S8; see also figure 18). There may be an effect
of familiarity with negative framing in media reports—the graphs reveal interesting patterns of
comprehension which may relate to people’s prior beliefs about likely death and survival rates
from COVID-19, and present interesting avenues for further research. Another possible part of the
explanation may be that people pay more attention to negative stimuli. Research has suggested
that negative information is more thoroughly processed compared with positive information [60],
and that people are loss averse [61,62], meaning they are more sensitive to losses compared with
gains, which might explain attentional differences to the negatively framed information versus the
positively framed information.
Results were more ambivalent with respect to the visual scale with the influenza comparison, with
the primary analysis finding a possible advantage (versus the text-only condition, only for
percentages) and the exploratory regressions a possible disadvantage (versus the same scale
without the ‘flu comparison, only for frequencies).
(2) Although the tool was not giving specific advice or recommendations, we examined whether it
affected people’s levels of concern about specific behaviours (such as shopping in a crowded
supermarket) and found that the portrayed risk level did affect the level of worry that
participants expressed about carrying out these different behaviours, suggesting a degree of
(hypothetical) behavioural intent as a result of seeing the communication.
(3) Dose–response consistency was good: those who were presented with higher levels of risk perceived
the risk to be higher, as measured by both their perceived likelihood of the risk (objective risk
perception) and the levels of worry they expressed about the risk (subjective risk perception).
(4) Hazard–response consistency refers to whether ‘people facing a hazard that is higher in risk perceive
the risk as greater and/or show a greater readiness to take action than people exposed to a hazard
that is lower in risk’ [42]. To get a sense of whether hazard–response consistency was present, we
asked participants to what extent they were more concerned with catching COVID-19 than
seasonal ‘flu. There was no difference in the responses between those who saw the comparative
risk of seasonal ‘flu and those who didn’t in Experiment 4.3: in both cases, the mean response






































concerning than the risk from seasonal ‘flu, suggesting that hazard–response consistency was present
irrespective of whether the ‘flu comparator was included.
(5) We found no differences between the variances in the cognitive or emotional risk perception
responses to the five different formats tested in Experiment 4.3, implying that they were all
roughly equivalent in how homogeneously they were interpreted by participants, and there was
also no significant difference between the variances in the responses to the formats tested in
Experiment 4.3 and participants being given the bald absolute risks as a percentage in Experiment
2.1 (testing the 0.1% and 20% risk levels individually). This suggests that the communication via
the formats we tested was as uniform in its messaging as communication via a simple percentage.
(6) Regarding subjective audience response, the negatively framed scale with age comparators was
preferred when the formats were overtly ranked, but there were no significant differences between
the subjective ratings of clarity and understanding between the different formats.
(7) Possible failures of the communication would be most serious if people misunderstood their risk
level and were either greatly worried or greatly over-reassured as a result. As figure 20 shows,
participants imagining that they had been told they had a 20% chance of dying if they caught
COVID-19 would be considerably more likely to be concerned about their behaviour as a result,
while those imagining they had been told the lower risk levels were less likely to be concerned
about their behaviour. So, failures in either direction could have an impact on worry and
behaviour. The most problematic format in this regard may be the scale with positive framing:
there is some evidence that it was more poorly comprehended, and also evidence that those who
viewed it were less concerned: they demonstrated a lower perceived likelihood of death, and less
concern about engaging in high-risk behaviours. Exploratory regressions also suggested they
exhibited more agreement with ‘If this result applied to me, I would not be worried about
catching COVID-19’, less agreement with ‘If this result applied to me, I would likely be anxious
and it might affect my mental health’ and less agreement with ‘If this result applied to me I’d be
more concerned about my risk from COVID-19 than from seasonal ‘flu’.
‘Actionability’ is a key component of good risk communication: the audience need to know what they
can do with the information they have just received (e.g. [63,64]). Unsurprisingly, our mock-ups didn’t
differ significantly in actionability, given how similar they were in the information they gave about
potential actions that could be taken, but all achieved means well above the mid-point of the scale.
In terms of the remaining design decisions, we had hoped to clarify whether presenting the risk
information in a visual format (such as a risk ladder) had an advantage over a purely text-based
format. Research has long emphasized the advantages of visualizing numerical information, providing
at-a-glance estimation and context [19]. In the case of very small risks, and those where comparative
information is likely to be helpful, risk ladders are usually recommended (e.g. [19]). Our exploratory
regression suggested that participants viewing a risk ladder visualization had lower perceptions of the
risks as compared with the text-only version—whether that is desirable or not is a matter of the
communicator’s aims. However, subjectively, the audience preferred the presentations with visualizations.
We also hoped to determine the effects of positive versus negative framing. Although we saw no
significant differences for our measure of emotional risk perception, levels of agreement/disagreement
with questions such as ‘If this result applied to me, I would not be worried about catching COVID-19’
suggested that the positive framing reduced concern (which again, may be seen as either desirable or
undesirable by different communicators), and our regression analyses suggested that it may have
reduced comprehension as well.
Finally, we hoped to determine whether comparators were useful, and, if so, whether ‘personas’
displaying different risk factors (mainly age) or the individual’s own risk of dying from ‘flu provided
more useful comparisons. The audience appeared, subjectively, to prefer the personas of different risk
factors, in line with our qualitative interviews.7. Discussion
This extensive study, employing a mix of qualitative interviews alongside pre-registered quantitative
experiments, was designed to help provide professional communicators with an empirical evidence






































risk of dying from COVID-19. Within the study we investigated a number of areas where we hope our
findings will prove of use and here lay out what we consider to be our main findings:
7.1. What are the information needs of the public? Perception of risk of dying from COVID-19
When asked to give a numerical estimate, the UK population surveyed tended to greatly overestimate the
absolute risks of dying from COVID-19 if infected (for example, in Experiment 4.1, the chance of death of
a persona with no risk factors was deemed by many to be around 5–20%, while higher risk personas
were rated as having above 50% chance of death). This overestimate of the likelihood could be the
result of a combination of factors such as the risk being ‘dread’ (new, little-understood, potentially
fatal, etc.) [1], and extremely well-covered in the media, causing availability bias [65]. However, it is
also likely that for many people ‘average’ risk ‘feels like’ 50%, or the middle of a slider—similar to the
well-known effect of ‘50 : 50’ meaning ‘I don’t know’ [66,67]. Several of the free-text comments that
people gave suggested that some participants thought in this way. Participants’ estimates of their own
chance of dying from COVID-19 if infected (given their own major risk factors) was also often
inaccurate (survey 1).
All these attempts to elicit a subjective feeling of risk are subject to problems of context. When asked
to give an answer via a position along a slider bar, how do people interpret the slider: their own risk
within the range of risks from COVID-19 faced by the UK population as a whole? Or their own risk
from COVID-19 as compared with their own risk of death from another cause? The qualitative
interviews revealed that people generally do not think numerically about their risk of dying from
COVID-19, thus we expect that very few are likely to think of it as ‘a percentage chance of death’.
Efforts to communicate risk precisely should aim to help people translate from the precise numerical
language to their own subjective experience [53].
7.2. Which format should probabilities be presented in? Perception of risk conveyed by
numerical formats
The first part of communicating a numerical concept is the format of the numbers used. In accordance
with previous findings (e.g. [24–28]), in Experiment 4.2 (and also in other experiments within the
study) we found that the same number expressed as a percentage, as ‘x in 100’, ‘x in 1000’ and ‘1 in
x’ were perceived as representing increasingly higher levels of risk. The ‘1 in x’ format has long been
known to evoke higher risk perceptions than other formats [24,68]. Differences between the other
formats are usually ascribed to ‘ratio-bias’ and ‘denominator neglect’ [25], where the numerator is
more salient than the denominator. We were able to quantify the difference in risk perception as an
11%, 13% and 30% point increase from the perception of the percentage format, respectively. Our
experiments as a whole covered four orders of magnitude (from 0.01% to 20%)—the range of
numbers most likely to be used in this particular context—but the smallest percentage in Experiment
4.2 was 0.1%, and the relatively high perception of the risk when presented as ‘1 in x’ may reduce as
the risk gets smaller (and hence ‘x’ gets bigger), as there may be a trend in decreasing difference
between the formats at the 0.1% risk level, suggested in figure 14.
7.3. How should context be provided for the numbers?
Previous literature has stressed the need for an appropriate choice of comparator when providing
context for a risk [30,31,33–35]. We approached the problem through qualitative interviews followed by
quantitative testing. Participants in the qualitative interviews rejected the concept of comparing
COVID-19 with most other causes of death, with only seasonal ‘flu being considered a similar kind of
risk (possibly because of coverage in the media as a comparison). Our results from Experiment 2.1
suggested that while giving comparative information in the form of the risks of COVID-19 to people of
different ages appeared to assist people make an assessment of the risk, giving contextual information
in the form of a description of the person at risk (including their main risk factors), had a greater effect
(particularly at the higher risks, where the ‘persona’ carried more information about additional health
conditions). This echoed the findings of the qualitative interviews, where interviewees tended to think
of risk in the form of personas—having in their heads an impression of the risk factors of a ‘high risk’
and ‘low risk’ person. Providing numerical absolute risks for these kinds of instinctive personas may






































7.4. Should the numbers be visualized and how?
Another way to help translate numerical concepts more instinctively, particularly for those of lower
numeracy, is to use visual representations [69,70]. We attempted to combine persona descriptions and
age comparators with a visual scale, to maximize the potential for assisting comprehension of the risks.
Adding the linear visual scale alongside the presentation of absolute risks appeared to reduce
participants’ perceptions of the risks in exploratory regressions comparing the two matched formats in
Experiment 4.3 (‘age comparators, text-only’ versus ‘age comparators plus visual scale’). This is in
contrast to findings from Lee & Mehta [71], who found no difference in risk perception between
written and visual risk communication in a similar scenario, and Siegrist et al. [26] who found that a
visual scale increased perception of risk. However, in both these studies, the logarithmic ‘Paling
perspective scale’ was used, and in the latter study the ‘text only’ condition did not convey any
comparator risks, unlike the scale tested in our experiment.
We did not see a difference in perception of the risk based on its position on the scale (in Experiment
3.1) as expected following the work of Sandman et al. [32] when testing logarithmic and linear scales, but
we did find that the logarithmic scale was slightly less trusted, which again added to the comments in
qualitative interviews around logarithmic scales seeming potentially misleading.
Adding a visual scale did not seem to enhance objective comprehension of the risk (either as a
percentage or as a frequency) in Experiment 4.3—although participants could have been reading this
information from the text-only part of the communication rather than the visual part.
Following suggestions from the qualitative interviews, we made sure that where the top of the scale
was cut off, this was adequately explained (very few people have a risk higher than x), and that a persona
of the sort of person whom participants could imagine as the highest risk was placed near the top with
their absolute risk shown, to underline this.7.5. Should positive or negative framing of the numbers be used?
Positive and negative framing is known to be able to cause a difference in people’s perceptions of risks (e.g.
[40]). In Experiment 4.3, we found that people who had been shown the number likely to survive rather
than the number likely to die found that the risk seemed lower and was less worrying when it came to
concern ‘if this result applied to me…’. It was also relatively well-liked (though not the favourite) when
five formats were ranked by participants. However, participants seeing positive framing may have also
comprehended the numbers more poorly. This may have been for a number of reasons, such as that a
negative framing is more familiar to people in the context of COVID-19 (e.g. media and governments
typically reporting deaths, and not survival rates), and is only an exploratory finding.7.6. Trustworthiness
Interviews suggested that trustworthiness was a crucial dimension to consider—something previously
emphasized in the risk communications literature (e.g. [72]). In line with previous research (e.g. [73]),
our interviews suggested that trustworthiness and relevance were enhanced by appropriate branding
and making it clear that the results presented were based on research (ideally from a trustworthy
source) and on relevant data. Previous experience (e.g. [73]) suggests that people are sensitive to cues
of quality of evidence (such as sizes of datasets and relevance of the population on which the
evidence is based), as well as assessing the information’s source.
As already mentioned, in Experiment 3.1, we saw that a linear scale was significantly more trusted
than its logarithmic alternative. In Experiment 4.3, we found that although trustworthiness was not
affected by the different graphical formats presented (now using linear scales only), it was affected by
the level of risk being communicated. Prospect theory [61,74] and negativity bias [60,75] predict that
losses loom larger than gains, and research by Slovic [72] showed a ‘trust asymmetry’ where bad
news affects trust more than good news does. Eiser & White [76] found that this asymmetry was
more pronounced for more concrete and tangible events, as well as greater hazard risk potential. This
may help explain the effect of the highly negative information (i.e. the high risk of death) over the
more positive information (i.e. the low risk). Additionally, denial or avoidance are ways of coping
with stress [77,78], and trusting more negative information less could help to psychologically mitigate







































In exploratory regressions in Experiment 4.3 (electronic supplementary material, appendix S7), male sex
was also predictive of higher cognitive risk ratings, which may seem surprising given that regressions
also show that male sex was predictive of lower worry in responses to questions about engaging in
various ‘higher-risk’ behaviours such as going to a large cinema, and given that men perceived a
lower level of overall risk from COVID-19 than women, in line with previous literature [79,80]. One
possible explanation is that ratings of risk to individuals are relative to prior expectations: if a person
perceives COVID-19 to be very risky, then they may rate even a 20% risk of death as ‘low’ because it
is lower than their expectations. However, in our data, higher prior COVID-19 risk perception was
predictive of higher cognitive risk ratings. Another explanation could be that males and females differ
in both their cognitive assessment of the likelihoods of death (with males being higher) and their
worry about that likelihood (with females being higher). However, the picture may be more complex,
as our regressions suggested that being male predicted higher levels of emotional risk perception
(worry), despite predicting lower levels of concern about higher-risk behaviours.
Older age was predictive of lower cognitive risk ratings but not emotional risk rating (worry), which
again is slightly counterintuitive as one might expect the same absolute risk to feel less risky to an older
person given the lower relative risk that it would present to them. ci.8:2017218. Conclusion
This series of rounds of qualitative interviews and quantitative experiments give useful insights into how
personalized information about the risks of COVID-19 might be clearly communicated to individuals.
Communicators first need to consider where their aims fall on the spectrum from purely informing
individuals of the risk to outright persuasion to follow a certain behavioural outcome. Many of the design
and communication choices that need to be made will be based on whether the communicator wants
the message to be persuasive, and if so, in what direction.
Many of the effect sizes that we found are small (apart from those around the difference that the
different format of the number, such as percentages versus ‘1 in x’ makes), as is common for
experimental work on risk communication. However, when scaled up to population levels, for
instance for mass communications, where tens of thousands (or more) people are forming the
audience, small effect sizes can still have an impact on outcomes that is worth considering.
Here, we provide some guidelines based on our findings:8.1. How to express the numbers
Percentages appear to be the clearest format, having the smallest variance in perceived risk. They also
make the risk seem lowest, with chances expressed as ‘x out of 100’, ‘x out of 1000’ or ‘1 in x’
conveying increasingly higher likelihoods (on the range of orders of magnitude we tested—down to 1
in 10 000). In order to provide balance, then, communicators might choose to use both a percentage
and a frequency with a large denominator for the main risk score. However, beware using too many
numbers on a single scale or presentation format as they can become visually busy and
overwhelming, which can have negative effects on comprehension due to cognitive load [81].
The result should not be described as ‘your risk’ as statistics necessarily rely on limited and
incomplete information, describing subpopulations rather than individuals. We suggest using ‘Risk
result’ or ‘Risk level’ as descriptions.8.2. Framing: the number of people who die or the number who survive?
Participants subjectively liked being shown the number of people likely to survive rather than the
number likely to die, and seemed to find the result less concerning. However, participants seeing
positive framing may have also understood the numbers less well. We would recommend using
negative framing but including a single translation to the positive within the format (e.g. ‘We would
expect 2 in 1000 people to die… that means that 998 out of 1000 would survive’), once again with the






































8.3. Using a visual scale: log versus linear
Despite the difficulties of representing several orders of magnitude on the same scale, participants
generally found the linear scale more easily understandable and slightly more trustworthy.
Representing multiple orders of magnitude on a linear scale generally requires cutting it at a suitable
maximum point, and participants in qualitative interviews stressed the importance of explaining why
that maximum point had been chosen and using a description of the type of person who would have
that very highest level of risk to help them calibrate their perceptions to the numerical scale in front of them.
8.4. Using a visual scale: colour
Colour can affect the impact and interpretation of a scale. In this study, we did not investigate these
effects systematically. Issues of accessibility to those with visual impairments as well as the principles
of good design should guide the use of colour, as well as empirical testing.
8.5. Giving context
An absolute risk figure (e.g. ‘2% chance of dying if you catch COVID-19’) is, on its own, generally
unhelpful to members of the public. The public are very unfamiliar with the absolute risks posed by
COVID-19, but their interpretation of the absolute risks of those individuals changed when given
some contextual information.
A visual scale with a well-chosen and well-explained maximum point helps give context, but
participants in these studies also found that the most useful comparators were the absolute risks faced
by individuals of defined risk factors (predominantly age, in the case of COVID-19) covering the full
range from very low-risk individuals to very high-risk individuals—in other words, putting numbers
against a series of ‘personas’ that are their natural mental models.
Giving people context in the form of other risks that they might face was deemed slightly less helpful.
This may be because people were unclear of the magnitude of those other risks, or because those risks
were seen to be qualitatively different in important dimensions [28], although seasonal ‘flu risk was
an acceptable comparator to some. Similarly, choosing personas that weren’t easily imagined (‘you if
you didn’t have these risk factors’, or ‘an average person of this age’) were less helpful than those
which could be brought to mind clearly and distinctly (such as those which defined both age and
health conditions).
8.6. Limitations
All mock-ups of results shown to participants in this study were hypothetical, and participants were
asked to imagine receiving that result in real life. This removes both the prior beliefs that that
participant may have had about their own risk (making it impossible to assess the effects of those
prior beliefs and potential conflict with the information being communicated), and the emotional
component of receiving a result relating to one’s own mortality.
Before implementing any such personalized risk communication it would be important to test the
proposed format on participants receiving their real results, with appropriate ethical permissions and
support in place.
Our experiments also only covered the communication of risks between 0.01% and 20%. Depending
on the absolute risks being communicated (e.g. whether it is ‘the risk of dying from COVID-19 if you
catch the virus’ or ‘the risk of catching and then dying as a result of the virus’), the absolute risks for
many people could be much lower than this (especially at times of low prevalence of the virus).
Further research would be necessary to extend this work to lower percentages where different visual
and numerical formats may be required.
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